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central bank related variables as well as political variables turn out to have the least empirical
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1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many countries experienced high inflation. A broad consensus
emerged that this was unacceptable. Accordingly, policymakers around the world adopted, or were
enabled to adopt, policies designed to bring inflation down. As can be inferred from Figure 1, one of
the most striking developments of the past two decades has been a steadily declining trend in CPI
inflation and its volatility. In 1997 the (untruncated) average inflation was 21 %. By 2015 it had
dropped to 5 %.
Many factors are believed to have contributed to the drop in inflation. They range from stronger
commitments to price stability, improved monetary policy, the emergence of the New Economy and
the attendant acceleration of productivity growth, forces of globalization that increased competition
and enhanced the flexibility of labor and product markets, disciplined fiscal policy, the weakening
influence of trade unions, favorable exogenous circumstances, and even luck. All these likely played
a role, and disentangling the relative importance of each remains an important challenge.
However, controlling inflation has proven to be difficult once again. Since the inception of the
financial turmoils in 2007 and the accompanying economic slump, numerous countries have faced
inflation levels regarded to be uncomfortably low. Once the effective lower bound to nominal short-
term rates was reached, central banks were forced to adopt new measures to avert the danger of
deflation. The result was a sizeable creation of monetary base. Despite huge efforts to kick-start
inflation, it has remained stubbornly low.
The general acceptance that the key objective of monetary policy should be price stability has
aroused considerable interest in understanding the driving forces behind inflation. Much of the
work that focuses on the dynamics of inflation has been concerned with how it is related to changes
in other important macroeconomic and other variables. Empirical work attempting to document
determinants of inflation in a cross-country setup is broad and diverse in its conclusion. Most of it
addresses few potential determinants and for a limited number of countries or periods. Nor does it
check for robustness of results with alternative estimation techniques. Moreover, model comparisons
are hardly done and non-linearities have often not been analyzed. Empirical analysis that takes these
shortcomings into account may help improve our understanding of what explains inflation over time
and across countries.
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This offers the background to our paper with the final intention to identify and quantify the
sources of inflation and motivates our extension of the empirical literature along several dimen-
sions. First, since the behavior of inflation has become increasingly difficult to understand,1 we
tested several models and variables based on the abundant theoretical and empirical research. The
explanatory variables were properly lagged, allowing us to establish possible causal links.
Second, although the trend downwards in inflation is a global phenomenon that had been noted
years ago (Rogoff (2003)), research has typically focused on low-inflation (advanced) countries. For
this reason we not only base our analysis on as many theoretical explanations as possible but also
on the highest number of countries, including advanced countries, emerging market and developing
economies (EMDEs), as well as low-income countries (LICs). To this end we pre-processed and ana-
lyzed an exceptionally large, comprehensive data set including annual observations of 40 explanatory
variables for 124 countries stretching from 1997 to 2015.
Third, in order to properly take into account countries’ heterogeneity, we recurred to mixed mod-
els whose variables are motivated by both economic theory and a pure data-based approach. Next
to allowing for a combination of countries with different characteristics, we extend the literature –
which is focused on linear regressions, where inflation is regressed against a specific variable and
control variables – by accounting for potential non-linearities. For this purpose, we apply additive
mixed-models and extend the literature by providing the necessary software implementation of con-
ditional Akaike Information Criteria (cAIC) for additive mixed models with observation weights.
The resulting assignment of cAIC to the models enabled us to compare several theories and the
data-driven approach with one another.
The questions we pose are the following: (i) What are the main drivers of global inflation and how
did they evolve over the last two decades? (ii) Is an atheoretical approach superior to well-known
economic theories? (iii) Are the estimates derived from data that preceded the financial crisis robust
to events that have unfolded since then?
We found clear answers. First, we uncover several variables which are related to inflation con-
sistently across models, some in a linear and others in a non-linear way. Second, the data-driven
approach does also well in terms of cAIC but is inferior to the winning model which is based on
economic theory. Third, the financial crisis has brought about structural breaks, which changed the
association of several variables with inflation compared with the pre-crisis period.
1See Blanchard (2016) and Borio (2017) have even put into question economists’ knowledge of the inflation process.
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In more detail and across the entire sample of 124 countries and for the whole observation period,
the interaction of energy price and energy rents stand out among 40 explanatory variables. The effect
of energy prices varies depending strongly non-linearly on the level of energy rents. Other important
determinants are the output gap and globalization. The output gap is positively and linearly related
to inflation while globalization lowers inflation at a decreasing rate. Credit, money and GDP growth
are comparably less important drivers. Credit growth has a weak and mainly linear and arguably
even negative effect, if at all, while money growth is related to inflation in a positive and close to
linear way. GDP growth is positively and linearly related to inflation. By contrast, GDP per capita
(pc) exerts a highly non-linear effect. Further less important explanatory variables are a country’s
inflation history and ageing of society. The higher inflation a country experienced in the past,
the higher current inflation is. The ageing of society is negatively and linearly linked to inflation,
although the effect is relatively weak. Central bank related variables as well as political variables
turn out to have the least empirical relevance. Estimated on a subset of countries, we further find
evidence of public debt denomination and exchange rate arrangements playing a noteworthy role.
While an increasing share of foreign-currency debt has a non-linear effect, the transition from a fixed
to a flexible currency arrangement is linearly and negatively linked to inflation. Finally, other public
debt variables and inflation targeting have weaker explanatory power.
Moreover, the comparison between the period before and after the global financial crisis yields
several structural breaks. The inflationary effect from natural resources has even strengthened after
the crisis whereas the effect from the output gap weakened. By contrast, globalization forces have
remained constant over time. Interestingly, credit creation had a neutral or even dampening impact
on inflation since the crisis, whereas money growth strengthened its effect. GDP growth has also
strengthened its link with inflation in the post-crisis period in contrast to GDP pc whose effect
has hardly changed over time. The effect from past inflation has become stronger since the crisis
in contrast to ageing whose effect was not affected. Public debt denomination was subject to a
substantial structural break. The non-linear inflation reducing impact before the crisis was replaced
by a linear inflation increasing effect arising from more foreign currency debt. The comparison
between the pre- and post-crisis period resulting from the substitution of a fixed exchange rate by a
more flexible exchange rate suggests a lowering effect on inflation before the crisis. After the crisis
this effect is less clear.
3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature and
the ensuing explanatory variables underlying our empirical models. Section 3 presents the data. In
section 4 we lay out our estimation methods and the model selection procedure. The main findings
are given in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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Figure 1: Truncated distribution of inflation over time with LOESS
2 Literature
In this section we offer a brief survey of the most common explanations of inflation to derive testable
implications.2 We begin by one of the most established folk wisdoms in monetary economics. Ac-
cordingly, inflation is said to be a monetary phenomenon. However, in criticizing the pure monetarist
view, Kuttner (1990) noted that although some measure of money (possibly M2) may be the main
determinant of inflation in the long run, it does not follow that only money matters in determining
inflation over all horizons. A number of empirical studies show that the sources of inflation are
quite diverse and include excess demand or slack, a country’s institutional set-up, the monetary
policy strategy in place, fiscal imbalances, globalization, demography, (shocks to) prices of natural
resources, and past inflation. We will discuss them in turn, present a selection of empirical studies
on each of these topics, and explain the choice of variables for the empirical analysis.
2A comprehensive literature review is provided in the Literature Appendix.
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2.1 Money, Credit and Slack
2.1.1 Money
A key macroeconomic axiom is the quantity theory of money. It posits a proportional relation
between the growth rate of money and inflation. Numerous studies confirm that sustained high
growth rates of money in excess of its production of goods and services eventually produce high
and rising inflation rates. For instance, Batini and Nelson (2001) show a relationship between
inflation and money growth on UK and US data for the period 1953–2001. Recent studies, for
instance, Teles et al. (2016) confirm the quantity theory of money. However, the long-run link
between money growth and inflation has weakened in low inflation countries, especially after the
Great Inflation period. Gallegati et al. (2019) document in a wavelet-based exploratory analysis
covering 16 developed countries and spanning 140 years a close relationship between excess money
growth and inflation over time horizons between 16 and 24 years.
The quantity theory does not specify which definition of money supply should be used in empirical
tests. Many authors use various measures of the money supply. We account for the potential effect
of money supply on inflation using the growth rate of M2 (M2 Gr. (%)).
2.1.2 Credit
In addition to money we also examine the effect of credit creation.3 Two opposite effects are possible
– an inflationary and a disinflationary one. On the one hand, an inflation-raising effect may arise
from credit expansions that go hand in hand with money creation. On the other, domestic credit to
private sector may proxy financial depth and as such containing information that is expected to be
negatively related to inflation.4 In addition, a credit expansion that leads to a build-up investment
and an expansion of production capacities will put downward pressure on prices.
3 Schularick and Taylor (2012) uncovered a decoupling of money and credit in a sample of 14 advanced countries
during the 20th century.
4See Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010).
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Figure 2: M2 (% GDP) and Credit (% GDP) over time with LOESS and a 95 % CI
We employ two measures of domestic credit. The first refers to credit to the private sector in
percent of GDP (Credit (% GDP)) and the second in percent of GDP growth (Credit (% GDP) Gr.).
Figure 2 plots the evolution of credit and M2 relative to GDP. Both have been trending upwards
almost in parallel.
2.1.3 Slack
Another central tenet of macroeconomics is that the real and nominal sides of the economy are
linked through a Phillips curve relationship, in which inflationary pressures reflect the level of real
economic activity and inflationary expectations. Two specifications have arisen over time: the
Traditional (or New Classical) and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In the New Classical form,
inflation is a function of lagged expected inflation and a contemporaneous measure of excess demand,
often measured by the output gap, defined as actual minus potential output. Inflation will tend to
rise if the gap is positive, while it will tend to fall as long as the gap is negative. If the output
gap is zero, inflation will remain stable. In the New Keynesian model, current inflation is related to
(rationally) expected future inflation, along with a measure of excess demand.
There is considerable evidence that the output gap is an important determinant of inflation.5
However, inflation seems to have become less responsive to measures of the domestic output gap
than in the past. Blanchard (2016) found that a drop in the unemployment rate in the US has less
than a third as much power to raise inflation as it did in the mid-1970s.
5See, for instance, Coe and McDermott (1997), Deniz et al. (2016), Gross and Semmler (2017), and Jasova et al.
(2019).
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An important question is whether the financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to structural breaks. One
particular point in case concerns the Phillips curve. The background is the missing disinflation which
was observed in advanced economies in the aftermath of the financial crisis.6 Several hypotheses
have been advanced. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) suggest that firms’ inflation expectations
moved countercyclically during the recession and recovery because they are overly influenced by oil
prices, which increased from 2009 to 2011 – and extending their argument7 – fell from 2014 through
2017. A second set of explanations focuses on special features of the financial crisis. Gilchrist
et al. (2017) show that financial distortions created an incentive for firms to raise prices in response
to adverse financial or demand shocks to preserve internal liquidity and avoid accessing external
finance. This strengthened the countercyclical behavior of markups and attenuated the response of
inflation to output fluctuations. Another explanation refers to expectations. Mazumder (2018) finds
a stable Phillips curve for the euro area using short-term professional survey expectations data, and
he attributes the weakening of inflation to a decline in expected inflation.
We calculate potential or trend output by a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter-based measure with a
lambda set to 6.25. The resulting variable is denoted as Out. Gap (%).
2.2 Institutions
The potentially numerous motives for authorities to inflate may be prevented by sound institutions.
We split a country’s institutional setup in four separate items—central bank independence, central
bank transparency, political instability and orientation, as well as economic growth.
2.2.1 Central Bank Independence
Rogoff (2003) argues that improved institutions and more sophisticated policymakers, not to men-
tion a more sophisticated public, have played pivotal roles in the global reduction in inflation. Still,
the fact that inflation has fallen even in countries with weak institutions, unstable political systems,
thinly staffed central banks, etc. raises the possibility that other factors have also been important.
One fact that seems to have been on the rise throughout the world is increased independence of cen-
tral banks. As a consequence, central bank independence has received much attention in explaining
cross-country differences in inflation rates.
6For recent reviews of papers on the apparent flattening of the U.S. Phillips curve in the 2000s, and especially
since the financial crisis, see McLeay and Tenreyro (2019) and Hooper et al. (2019).
7See Stock and Watson (2019).
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However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between central bank independence and
inflation is mixed. For instance, Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) provide a detailed analysis of the
effect of central bank independence on inflation and its variability based on annual indices for more
than 100 central banks. They find some, albeit statistically inconsistent, negative association with
inflation.
We will use the Dincer-Eichengreen index of de jure central bank independence (CBI ), which
ranges from 0 (most dependent) to 1 (most independent) available from 1998 to 2010. In addition we
measure the occurrence of turnovers at the headquarters of the central bank during the year (TOR)
(Dreher et al., 2010). This proxy of de facto independence has the advantage of allowing us to exploit
the whole data set, circumventing the limit other authors encountered due to the lack of long time
series on central bank independence measures for a long list of countries.8 In the interpretation of
results is must be considered that central bank independece and the turnover rate may measure two
distinct dimensions of institutional independence.9
2.2.2 Central Bank Transparency
One further fact that needs to be accounted for in the analysis of central bank independence is
that its increase has been accompanied by greater transparency. Most central banks nowadays
announce their objectives with quantitative targets, publish numerical macroeconomic forecasts and
are open about their policy decisions, marking a departure from long-standing practice which valued
confidentiality. This change is not only a reflection of accountability requirements that go hand in
hand with increased central bank independence but also expresses the conviction within the central
banks community that greater transparency improves monetary policy effectiveness.10
Overall, the empirical literature documents beneficial effects from transparency. For example,
Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) find that greater transparency is associated with lower average levels
of inflation.
We measure central bank transparency (CBT ) by the updated values of Dincer and Eichengreen
that extend the observations reported in Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) by four more years until
2014.11
8For example, Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) point to this circumstance in their panel that prevents them from
evaluating their hypothesis on a broad cross-country basis.
9See Lustenberger and Rossi (2017).
10See Geraats (2014).
11We downloaded the updated version of February 2017.
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2.2.3 Political Instability and Orientation
Political instability adds another potentially important element to the analysis of institutions for
inflation. Aisen and Veiga (2005) show on a dataset covering around 100 countries from 1960 to 1999
that a higher degree of political instability is associated with higher inflation whereas higher degrees
of economic freedom and democracy are associated with lower inflation. Maruf and Alishahi (2017)
uncover, using the Panel maximum Likelihood method, a positive relationship between political
instability and inflation, especially in oil producing countries.
Various measures for political (in)stability have been applied. We rely on two. The first, Pol.
Stability, measures the percentage of cabinet members (“veto players”) dropping out in any given
year. The variable ranges from 0 (most stable) to 1 (most unstable). The second is the party orien-
tation with regard to their economic policy, Pol. Orien., categorized into three classes: left, center
and right. Both variables are obtained from the World Bank’s database of political institutions.
2.2.4 Growth
GDP and its growth rate, respectively, are considered important inflation-related factors that have
been used by many authors. GDP per capita has been used as a proxy for institutional quality.
Dollar and Kraay (2003) find that cross-country differences in institutions mirror the differences in
the levels of GDP per capita. Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) employ per capita income as
a proxy of a more general group of institutional arrangements. Hielscher and Markwardt (2012)
employ GDP per capita to control for various structural disparities as differences in the financial
sector, technologies or optimal inflation.
We rely on two forms, real GDP per capita (GDP pc (USD)) and real GDP growth (GDP Gr.
(%)).
2.2.5 Civil Rights
Another arguably important institutional element are political rights which we approximate with
three categorical variables taken from Freedom House: political rights (Pol. Rights) taking on seven
levels, civil liberties (Civil Lib.) also seven levels, and freedom status (Fr. Status) with three levels.
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2.3 Monetary Policy Strategies
The next group of variables accounts for the effects on inflation associated with two monetary policy
arrangements. The first relates to exchange rate arrangements, the second to the adoption of an
explicit inflation targeting (IT) strategy.
2.3.1 Exchange Rate Regime
One rationale for adopting a fixed exchange rate framework is that it operates as a disciplinary tool
for monetary authorities. Another benefit is that a fixed exchange rate signals enhanced credibility
of lower future inflation. As a result, inflation should be lower in countries with fixed exchange rates.
Many a study include a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime as a (further) check on
time-consistency issues. Overall, pegged regimes seem to yield lower inflation. Ghosh et al. (1997)
find robust evidence of lower inflation under pegged regimes in a sample of 150 countries over 30
years. The negative relationship between fixed exchange rates and inflation is also reported in
Cottarelli et al. (1998) and Husain et al. (2005). The reason seems to be a smaller money growth
and a higher credibility of the monetary system.
Exchange rate arrangements come in a variety of forms. For our analysis we extend the Reinhart-
Rogoff classification. The resulting variable (ERA) distinguishes four categories: no separate legal
tender, a crawling peg, managed floating and free floating.
2.3.2 Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting is an operational framework for monetary policy aimed at achieving a numerical
value (or range) for the inflation rate. A growing number of countries have adopted IT over the
last two decades. At the start of 2012, some 27 central banks were considered fully-fledged inflation
targeters, and several others were in the process of establishing a full IT regime.12
A growing literature on the effects of IT on average inflation, inflation volatility, average growth,
and its volatility has emerged. The evidence mostly concludes that IT is beneficial, lowering infla-
tion, its volatility and inflation expectations (Truman 2003, Hyvonen 2004, Vega and Winkelried
2005, among others). However, Ball and Sheridan (2005) argue that IT makes no difference among
industrial countries. More recent studies that include emerging markets tend to find stronger evi-
dence of positive effects from IT (Batini and Laxton (2007), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007),
12See Hammond (2012).
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Gonc¸alves and Salles (2008), Lin and Ye (2009), Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen (2012), and Deniz et al.
(2016)).
We created a binary variable, Infl. Targ., that takes the value of 1 for countries that have
adopted IT, and 0 otherwise. For its construction we relied on various annual reports on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions provided by the IMF.
2.4 Public Finances
A well-established theory in macroeconomics is that governments running persistent deficits have
sooner or later to finance those deficits with seigniorage. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, fi-
nancial bailouts, stimulus spending, and lower tax revenues have resulted in public debts in advanced
economies that have surpassed the peaks reached during World War I and the Great Depression.13
There are several theoretical channels for how public indebtedness may unleash inflation.
Conventional view According to the conventional view, an increase in public debt may cause
inflation by inducing a positive wealth effect on households. Demand for goods and services will rise
and ultimately inflate the economy.14
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic The main result of the seminal paper on unpleasant mon-
etarist arithmetic by Sargent and Wallace (1981) is that the effectiveness of monetary policy in
controlling inflation depends critically on its coordination with fiscal policy.
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level A similar reasoning lies behind the fiscal theory of the price
level (FTPL). Government debt not backed by expected future surpluses will ensue in inflation,
immediately or—depending on the maturity structure—in the future.15
Optimal Tax A fourth explanation is based on the Theory of Optimal Taxation, according to
which governments optimally equate the marginal cost of the inflation tax with that of output
taxes.16
13See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
14See Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
15See Cochrane (2001).
16See Phelps (1973), Ve´gh (1989), and Aizenman (1992).
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A large empirical literature examines the link between fiscal policy and inflation. Much of it
focuses on the role of budget deficits. Deficit financing is generally insignificant. However, in high-
inflation countries, there is a significant causality of fiscal deficits on inflation.
Rather than looking at inflation, several studies examine the link between money creation and
deficits. For the US, Hamburger and Zwick (1981) find for the period after World War II that
monetary growth was influenced by deficits, but only in specific episodes. Likewise, King and
Plosser (1985) investigated the link from fiscal deficit to inflation using time series analysis for 13
countries. They found no evidence of a link between monetary growth and deficits in the US, or a
link between deficits and seigniorage.
Campillo and Miron (1997) report a positive and significant relation between the public debt
ratio and average inflation in a sample from 1973 to 1994, consistent with optimal taxation.
More recent research on the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation has exploited both
time and cross-sectional dimensions of data. Again, results are inconclusive. In a panel estimation
on 32 countries, Karras (1994) does not find any inflationary impact of fiscal deficits. Fischer et al.
(2002) investigate the relationship between inflation, money growth, seigniorage and fiscal deficits on
data of 94 developing and developed countries during 1960–1995. According to their cross-sectional
analysis fiscal deficits are significantly positively linked to seigniorage and inflation. Exploiting their
panel data, they show that in countries with high average inflation, fiscal deficits are main drivers.
However, this effect is no longer significant in low-inflation countries or in high-inflation countries
during low-inflation episodes. Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) and Lin and Chu (2013), differently from
the literature, model a non-linear relation between fiscal deficit and inflation. In a dynamic panel
analysis for 107 countries within the period 1960-2001, they report a strong positive relationship for
high-inflation developing countries, whereas the relationship is insignificant for advanced countries.
Debt Management A potentially important issue is also the public debt structure. In the models
by Calvo (1988) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) higher levels of privately held government debt
with a longer nominal maturity raise the incentive for a government to attempt a surprise inflation.
In this literature, foreign-currency, inflation-indexed or short-term debt are remedies against surprise
inflation.
This topic has not been well examined in the empirical literature. Contributions are few and far
between and mostly focused on advanced countries. Missale and Blanchard (1994) provide evidence
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in line with the theoretical model on some highly-indebted European countries and Mandilaras and
Levine (2001) on a sample of 15 OECD countries.
Following the literature we use different measures of the fiscal stance. One captures the primary
balance, Prim. Bal. (% GDP). Another relates to debt growth (Debt (% GDP) Gr.). As proxies
for testing the implications of theories on public debt management we use average maturity on
new external debt (Matur.) as well as the percentage of external long-term public and publicly-
guaranteed (PPG) debt contracted in multiple currencies for the low- and middle-income countries
(Denom. (%)).
2.5 Globalization
Another potential driver of inflation over the past two decades is globalization. In the literature
there are at least two lines of argument about how increased globalization may affect inflation. The
first is due to Rogoff (2003) who argues that globalization reduces the inflation bias associated with
discretionary monetary policy by closing the gap between the target level of output pursued by
the central bank and the natural rate. The second line of thought holds that in a more integrated
world, competition between currencies forces central banks to adopt best practices and keep inflation
at bay. This disciplining effect is related to financial globalization, rather than real globalization
(Wynne and Kersting 2007).
Empirical results are mixed. In a study on a cross-section of 114 countries based on 1973-88
averages, Romer (1993) finds a robust negative relationship between openness, proxied by the ratio
of imports to GDP, and inflation, but essentially no relationship between openness and inflation in
the most developed countries. Bleaney (1999) reports, using 1989–98 averages, that the negative
relation between economic openness and inflation is not statistically significant. Campillo and Miron
(1997) find in a slightly extended sample period (1973-94) of 62 countries that even for developed
countries is greater openness associated with significantly lower inflation. Daniels et al. (2005) also
report a robustly negative effect of openness on inflation in a broad cross-section of countries.
The cited studies use a cross-section specification.The alternative is to exploit the time-series
structure of the data and use panel estimation methods. Alfaro (2005) reports an inflation increasing
effect of openness in a panel of 148 countries, whereas Sachsida et al. (2003) and Gruben and McLeod
(2004), employing instrumental variable estimators to deal with endogeneity problems, document
an inflation-reducing effect of openness.
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An important observation is that inflation has become increasingly globally synchronized.17 Re-
cent research has highlighted a large and growing role of global factors in explaining movements in
national inflation rates. Jasova et al. (2019) show that both global and domestic output gaps are
significant drivers of inflation in the pre-crisis (1994–2008) and post-crisis (2008–2017) periods, con-
trolling for nonlinear exchange rate movements. The panel consists of 26 advanced and 22 emerging
economies. However, after the crisis, the effect of the domestic output gap declines in advanced
economies, whereas in emerging economies it is the effect of the global output gap that declines.
We use two openness variables. One refers to economic openness (Trade Open. (% GDP)),
and reflects the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP (the most commonly used measure of
openness). The other variable measures the openness in the capital account (Fin. Open.). Next to
their isolated effect we also test the implication from their interactions.
2.6 Demography
In the effort to understand the sources of the decline in inflation observed over the recent past,
the adverse demographic trend has been invoked as a further possible driver. Mirroring theoreti-
cal ambiguity, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Anderson et al. (2014), Yoon et al. (2014),
Gajewski (2015), and Bobeica et al. (2017) find empirical evidence for ageing to be associated with
deflationary pressures. In contrast, Juselius and Taka´ts (2015) document that ageing leads to more
inflation. Similarly, Aksoy et al. (2015) estimate long-run effects of the changing age profile and find
that dependent cohorts enhance the inflationary pressures in the long run.
To examine the role of demography two variables are used: the share of the population older
than or equal to 65 (Age 65 (%)) and the share of population older than or equal to 75 (Age 75 (%)).
2.7 Natural Resources
The oil price is a well-known source of inflationary pressures in the world economy and the change
in the oil price is used as a control variable in several empirical studies. Cun˜ado and Pe´rez de
Gracia (2003) find evidence of cointegration in the oil price-inflation relation in 11 of 15 European
countries between 1960 and 1999. Typically, the impact of oil prices on domestic long-term inflation
is stronger among advanced countries than among developing countries. For instance, LeBlanc and
Chinn (2004) show that a 10 percentage points oil price increase boost inflation by 0.1–0.8 percentage
17See Ha et al. (2019).
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points in the US and the EU. In Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) a 1 percentage point increase in oil
prices is estimated to raise advanced country inflation by near 0.2 percentage points. Ha et al. (2019)
document in exceptionally a large sample of countries of 141 EMDEs and 34 advanced economies
over 1970-2018 that rapid changes in global inflation have occurred near turning points of the global
business cycle or in the wake of sharp movements in global oil prices.
We consider two energy-related variables, both from the World Bank. The first is a weighted
average of energy prices including coal, crude oil and gas (En. Prices (USD)). The second is the total
of natural resources rents (in % of GDP). It is the sum of rents on oil, natural gas, coal, mineral,
and forest, calculated as the difference between the price of a commodity and the average cost of
producing it (En. Rents (% GDP)).
In the empirical analysis we will let the two variables interact. The rationale is based on the
following testable hypothesis. In some countries earnings from natural resources, especially from
fossil fuels and minerals, account for a sizable share of GDP. Rising rents can result from either a
global commodity price increase due to a rise in world demand, or from a reduction of extraction or
harvesting costs. In the first scenario, both energy prices and commodity rents go up, causing an
increase in inflation in both exporting and importing countries. In the second, the demand-driven
impact on inflation is concentrated in commodity exporting countries with a contained effect on
global inflation.
2.8 Past Inflation
In empirical studies past inflation is often controlled for.18 Countries that experienced high inflation
might be more aware of its negative consequences and oppose it more forcefully. A related effect
that can be assessed by past inflation rates is inflation inertia, according to which inflationary shocks
may translate into higher inflation expectations through wage and price contracts, which in turn
materialize in terms of higher actual inflation.19
In the New Keynesian literature there are four approaches establishing a link between past and
current inflation. The first is the model by Gali and Gertler (1999) in which price reoptimization is
done following a rule of thumb. The second is the indexation model proposed by Christiano et al.
(2005), and the third the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002), which distinguishes
18See Campillo and Miron (1997), Kwon et al. (2009), Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010), Lin and Chu (2013),
Alpanda and Honig (2014), Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).
19See Lim and Papi (1997), Loungani and Swagel (2003), and Kamin and Klau (2003).
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between reoptimizing agents with adaptive expectations and those relying on past inflation as proxy
for expected inflation.
Bikai et al. (2016) use a Panel Vector Autoregressive approach on CEMAC countries (Economic
and Monetary Community of Central Africa) and data from 1990 to 2014 to show that money
supply and imported inflation are the two main sources of inflation. Nevertheless, money supply
and imported inflation account for only 30% of the dynamics of inflation. 64% of it is determined
by inflation itself.
In line with the literature, we account for the influence of inflation in the past. Specifically, we
constructed a 3-year moving geometric average of inflation (Past Infl. (%)).
2.9 Economic Theories
Based on this literature survey, we set up eight economic theories and a diversity of testable models,
capturing a diversity of country characteristics. Because it is not straightforward which variables
best reflect the development of money stock and GDP, each model includes either M2 Gr. (%) or
Credit (% GDP) Gr. in combination with either GDP pc (USD) or GDP Gr. (%), extended by
theory-specific explanatory variables. As a result, we obtained a range of four to 24 alternative
specifications. This gave rise to an estimation of 91 model-specific variable combinations (90 from
theory and one from the boosting algorithm). The exact variable combinations of each economic
model can be gleaned from the Table Appendix. In addition to variable compositions suggested by
economic theory we also predefined interactions of variables for which we assumed the existence of
a mutual impact on inflation. This applies to En. Prices (USD) and En. Rents (% GDP) as well
as Trade Open. (% GDP) and Fin. Open..
3 Data
Our aim is to cover as many countries as possible. This entails a trade-off between the number
of countries and the completeness of the data set. We were able to collect annual data running
from 1995 to 2015 for 124 countries for 19 explanatory variables and for the dependent variable
from publicly accessible sources, mainly the IMF and the World Bank. For inflation we finally
relied on the IMF’s change in the consumer price index (CPI) due to data availability. Further, we
derived growth rates from level variables, rolling averages from growth rate variables and further
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transformations from level variables. As a result, 33 variables and the dependent variable resulted
from this with missing information for some variables (2.8% of the observations). We imputed
the missing observations by means of an EM-Algorithm on bootstrapped samples (Honaker et al.,
2011). We limited the analysis to a single imputation instead of multiple imputed data sets due
to the lack of theoretical background for the averaging of random effects. However, we checked for
robustness of our results across data sets emerging from multiple runs of the imputation model. The
contemporaneous measurements of the resulting variables were replaced by their one- or two-year
lagged counterpart according to theory and empirical results. This led to a sample of 124 countries
spanning from 1997 to 2015. We refer to this data as the full sample.
Apart from the 33 variables, we additionally obtained 7 explanatory variables from various
scientific publications and the World Bank which were not available across the whole time span
1995 to 2015 or were only available for a subset of our 124 countries. Due to a non-compliance with
the imputation assumptions (i.e. the Missing At Random Assumption) these predictors were not
imputed. These variables are associated with the economic theories Institutions, Monetary Policy
Strategies and Public Finance. Their limited availability is one of the reasons for our two-stage
selection procedure described in section 4.3.
Finally, this gives rise to a classic longitudinal/panel data structure for a data set comprising 40
predictors (i.e. explanatory variables). According to the World Bank’s income classification, roughly
22% of the enclosed countries are low income countries, 35% belong to the lower-middle income
category, 20% to the upper-middle income category and 25% belong to high-income category.
4 Methods
In this section we discuss the background of the utilized statistical models and procedures. First,
we present the basic structure of additive mixed models (AMM) on which we rely to model annual
inflation rates. In order to capture the heterogeneity of the countries in our sample and to answer
the question of a structural break, we extend these AMMs by subject-specific weights and varying
coefficients. We then present our two-stage model selection procedure that we developed. All
estimated AMMs are compared by their cAIC. We discuss its central pillars in the context of AMMs
and present our contribution to its software implementation. The last aspect which will be explained
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in more detail is model-based boosting for variable selection which we used as the starting point of
our data-driven modeling of inflation (target variable).
4.1 Additive Mixed Models
Mixed models come as a natural choice to model longitudinal data and have been frequently applied
in other areas like epidemiology (e.g. Degruttola et al. (1991) and Pearson et al. (1994)).20 However,
to our knowledge, mixed models have not been applied to model inflation. Mixed models include
fixed and random effects. In our case, the fixed effects are composed additively of two major model
terms. The first model term is represented by linearly combined predictors. The second is given
by the summation of univariate and bivariate deterministic functions of the predictors which can
explicitly account for potential non-linearities between the predictors and the inflation variable. The
random effects act as surrogates for effects that have not been measured but induce heterogeneity
between the countries.
Next we present the formal structure of the AMMs. Each of the eight economic theories is
represented by a set Gl := {{A1,l}, {A2,l}, . . . , {Aml,l}}, l = 1, . . . , 8 containing multiple sets of
predictors Aj,l with total cardinality ml := | Gl |. Each set Aj,l is composed of disjunct subsets
Bj,l and Cj,l of predictors with linear and non-linear effects on the target variable, respectively, as
well as pairs Dj,l of variables in Bj,l with linear interaction effects and pairs Ej,l of variables in
Cj,l with non-linear interaction effects. Non-linear effects h of predictors x ∈ Cj,l are estimated
by univariate cubic P-Splines (Eilers and Marx, 1996) with penalties built on second differences.
Interaction effects f(·, ·) of pairs (x, x∗) of economic variables in Ej,l are modeled using penalized
bivariate tensor-product splines. The allocation to Bj,l, Cj,l, Dj,l and Ej,l can be found in Table
A.10 and A.11 in the Appendix. It was determined by the empirical degrees of freedom (EDF)
(Wood, 2017), estimated in preliminary model fitting where all univariate terms were assigned to
Cj,l and all bivariate terms to Ej,l. When the estimated EDFs were lower than 1.5 in the univariate
case, we reallocated predictors from Cj,l to Bj,l. When they were lower than 2.5 in the bivariate
case,21 we reallocated the interactions from Ej,l to Dj,l.
The model formula (1) shows the generic AMM, Mj,l, which is used to explain yi,t by a set of
predictors Aj,l. For each Aj,l there is exactly one Mj,l. In total, there are 90 (=
∑8
l=1ml) such
20See e.g. Pinheiro and Bates (2006) for an introduction.
21For tensor product bases constructed from marginal smooths to which identifiability constraints have already been
applied (Wood, 2017).
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models owing to the high number of predictor sets Aj,l comprised by each economic theory Gl. For
each Gl there exists exactly one set of models Ml which includes all corresponding Mj,l.
The dependent inflation variable y˜i,t is given for i = 1, . . . , n subjects and for t = 0, . . . , T annual
and equidistant points in time such that y˜i = (y˜i,0, . . . , y˜i,T )
>. The random vector y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜n)>
has been transformed with the natural logarithm after a shift by a positive constant c = 10.86 in
order to obtain a support so that supp(y˜ + c) ≥ 1, denoted by y := ln(y˜ + c).22 Each estimated
model Mj,l for Aj,l ∈ Gl is of the following form
yi,t = β0 + ηi,t + Zi,tbi + i,t (1)
ηi,t =
∑
x∈Bj,l
βxxi,t +
∑
(x,x∗)∈Dj,l
β(x,x∗)xi,tx
∗
i,t +
∑
x∈Cj,l
hx(xi,t) +
∑
(x,x∗)∈Ej,l
f(x,x∗)(xi,t, x
∗
i,t)
with bi = (bi,0, bi,1)
> iid∼ N(0, D), where a random intercept bi,0 and a random slope bi,1 are included
to capture the serial within-country correlation with b = (b1, . . . , bn)
>. The covariance matrix
D contains the variances τ0 and τ1 for the random intercept and slope, respectively, as well as
the covariance τ0,1 = τ1,0, which is assumed to be non-zero.. Further, i ∼ N(0,Σi) is assumed
with i ⊥⊥ bi where Σi is a diagonal matrix with the country-specific variances σ2i on its diagonal,
accounting for heterogeneous variances. Zi,t = (1, t) is the design vector for the random effects. The
observation weights wi = σ
2/σ2i emerge implicitly and are contained on the diagonal of the matrix
Wi such that Σi = σ
2W−1i . On a sample level, the error covariance structure R is a block-diagonal
matrix with Σi on its diagonal. We estimated Mj,l with the add-on package mgcv (Wood, 2011) for
the statistical computing software R (R Core Team, 2019) by Penalized Maximum Likelihood where
the maximum likelihood criterion is extended by a penalization term on the smooth model terms.
To answer the question of a structural break we used varying coefficient terms. For this purpose,
we let each fixed effect, apart from the fixed effect of the time variable, estimated for the models
included in the set of models MP as defined in section 4.3 interact with a categorical variable ei,t
which has two levels. The first level is taken on when t ≤ 2007 and the second level when t > 2007,
simultaneously for every country i. We re-estimated the models inMP with these varying coefficient
terms. Consequently, we obtain two simultaneous estimations of the same fixed effect variable – one
22A shift near zero would have produced numerical instabilities.
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for each of the two levels. However, apart from the fixed effect specification, every model assumption
was identical to the model assumption of the models comprised by MP .
4.2 cAIC
Model selection based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a common approach in econo-
metrics. The criterion was originally introduced by Hirotogu Akaike (Akaike, 1973) and is composed
of twice the maximized log-likelihood and a bias correction term derived by Akaike which, under
certain regularity conditions, can be estimated asymptotically by two times the dimension of the
unknown parameter vector specifying this log-likelihood (Saefken et al., 2018a). In order to apply
this criterion in the mixed model case, two adaptions need to be made.
First, we assume a joint Gaussian distribution of the random vector y and the random vector
b, both defined as above. We then can decide between two common views regarding the inference
and predictions in mixed models. The distribution of y conditional (cond.) on b leads to the cond.
likelihood of y given b, which then forms one component of our utilized cAIC. This is the first
adaption of the AIC introduced by Akaike towards the cAIC. In contrast, when the random effects
are integrated out, the marginal distribution of y emerges and thus provides the marginal likelihood.
We demonstrate our reasoning for the conditional over the marginal view on the AIC later in this
subsection.
Second, we need to adapt the bias correction term for the conditional likelihood utilized in the
cAIC. Following the introduction of the cAIC by Vaida and Blanchard (2005) the bias correction
term is defined as
BC = 2tr(H) (2)
where H is the hat matrix projecting y onto yˆ where yˆ is a prediction vector for y with the random
effects set to their predicted values. However, their proposal assumes known variance parameters and
neglects the estimation uncertainty of these variance parameters. This estimation uncertainty can
be taken into account whereby the bias correction term depends on the assumed cond. distribution
of y. For our Gaussian case, Liang et al. (2008) define
cAIC = −2logf(y|θ, b) + 2tr
(
∂yˆ
∂y
)
(3)
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where θ is defined as the vector of parameters in the model. Liang et al. (2008) approximate the
trace of the derivatives of the estimated and predicted quantities numerically. However, this becomes
computationally infeasible at a moderate sample size and a large quantity of models like in our case
(Greven and Kneib, 2010). Greven and Kneib (2010) provide closed form expressions for these
derivatives, circumventing the numerical approximations yielding an analytic representation of the
cAIC which takes estimation uncertainty of the variance parameters into account. Saefken et al.
(2018a) offer an efficient software implementation by means of the add-on package cAIC4 (Saefken
et al., 2018b).
The theoretical consideration underlying the derivation of the bias correction term introduced
in (3) assumes independent and identically distributed errors across the subjects (countries in our
case). As a result, the current software implementation in the cAIC4 package originally provided for
mixed models emerging from the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) and the gamm4 package (Wood
and Scheipl, 2017) incorporates this assumption as well. However, in our case, subject-specific error
variances need to be modeled to capture the heterogeneity across countries, making the assumption
of identically distributed errors inappropriate. The derived bias correction in (3) is thus no longer
applicable since it disregards the additional parameters used for the estimation of R as defined
above. In order to account for the estimation of a more complex error covariance structure in the
bias correction, Overholser and Xu (2014) prove that the bias correction term from (3) should be
adjusted by adding the number of unknown parameters r in the error covariance matrix R to the
trace of the matrix with the partial derivatives to give an asymptotically unbiased cAIC for the case
of non i.i.d. errors.
cAIC = −2logf(y|θ, b) + 2
(
tr
(
∂yˆ
∂y
)
+ r
)
. (4)
We implemented their proposal for diagonal error covariance matrices into the cAIC4 package and
further extended the package for mixed and additive models estimated with the mgcv package (Wood,
2011). Thus, we provide the first software implementation, to our knowledge, for the estimation of
the cAIC for mixed and additive models with non identically distributed errors. This novel extension
of cAIC4 will be made available to the CRAN repository for further applications.23 The proof of
the asymptotic assertion by Overholser and Xu (2014) gives an upper bound for the bias correction
23From a theoretical perspective, further research may provide a closed form solution for the bias correction term
for a more general error covariance structure.
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term that can also be provided through derivations based on the partial derivative of the prediction
vector yˆ for y with the random effects set to their predicted values.
We prefer the conditional perspective on the AIC over the marginal owing to the mixed model
representation of P-Splines. To see the connection in general, following Saefken et al. (2018a), we
consider an additive model of the following form
y = Ba+ ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2I) (5)
where B is the design matrix containing the evaluations of predictors evaluated with B-Spline basis
functions constructed from piece-wise polynomials and a the corresponding vector containing the
basis coefficients. We can now apply a single value decomposition to the quadratic penalty matrix
P = D′D with column rank d where D is the differences matrix, such that P = U Σ˜V ′. The first
k columns of U corresponding to the first k columns of Σ˜ containing positive singular values are
reassigned to U0 and the remaining d−k columns are reassigned to U1. We can thus obtain a matrix
T := [U1|U0] which transforms a such that
Ba = BT
β
b
 = Xβ + Zb (6)
yielding the common mixed model representation (Durbn and Currie, 2003). Currie et al. (2006)
extend the proof for penalized smooths in higher dimensions. (6) differs from our generic mixed model
(1) by different column ranks of the fixed and random design matrices and different dimensions of
the corresponding parameter vectors, depending on the employed predictor sets Aj,l as defined in
section 4.1. As a result, in our case with penalty order 2, the marginal AIC would only take the fixed
polynomial trend of degree one into account while the smooth deviation from this polynomial (i.e.
the random parts of this decomposition) can now be taken into account within (4) as well. Thus, the
cAIC, considered as a predictive measure in this context, accounts for the plausible assumption that
the non-linear functional relation between the predictors and y estimated in this sample represents
a more general relationship which is expected to be observed on new observations for the same
countries as well (Greven and Kneib, 2010; Saefken et al., 2018a).
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4.3 Selection Procedure
In this section we describe MP alluded to at the end of section 4.1. At the first stage, the cAIC
(4) is calculated for each model Mi,j and a first-stage winner model M
∗
l for each set of models Ml
is chosen on the basis of the lowest cAIC among all competing models comprised by Ml. At the
second stage, all M∗l , l = 1, . . . , 8, are reassembled in a new set MP . However, M
∗
l for l = 2, 3, 4
might be attached to predictor sets that are only available for a subsample of the full sample. Hence,
depending on the predictor sets attached to M∗2 , M
∗
3 and M
∗
4 these models are either added toMP
in order to participate in the second stage selection procedure or are excluded from this procedure.
In addition, a further model MB is added to MP . Its variables have been selected by model-based
boosting from all predictors available for the full sample, which is a subset of the union of all Aj,l.
The selected variables AB were refitted as an AMM under the same specification as mentioned in
section 4.1 but with a different set of predictors, yielding model MB . At the second stage, for the set
of models MP the overall winner model M∗∗ is selected based on the model with the lowest cAIC
in this set. It represents the model with the highest empirical relevance for inflation.
The reasoning behind this two-stage approach is twofold. First, from a monetary economics
perspective the set of predictors that embodies each Gl best from an empirical point of view is
not known a priori. Second, the availability of certain predictor sets Aj,l across time and countries
enforces this procedure to ensure an admissible model comparison by means of the Likelihood and
thus cAIC.
4.4 Model-based Boosting
The model-based boosting approach disregards the block by block segmentation of the predictors
presented in section 2, where the segmentation was based upon the associated economic theories
outlined in section 2. Therefore, we next want to find the optimal prediction function f∗ for y
through some prediction function f which is found by minimizing the expected loss EY,X [L(y, f(x))]
(i.e. risk) through a gradient descent algorithm in function space. x := (x1, . . . , xp) are all predictors
specified in section 2 which are available in the full sample (Hofner et al., 2014). In our case, f is
composed of a sum of functions of the predictors and the random effects specified by base learners.
Four kinds of base learners are specified. The first type are ordinary penalized least squares base
learners which model all categorical predictors available to the full sample. The second type are
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P-Spline base learners which model all continuous predictors available to the full sample. The third
type are bivariate P-Splines base learners allowing for the estimation of smooth interaction surfaces.
We allow for the same interactions of predictors as we have done for the models specified by economic
theory – En. Prices (USD) and En. Rents (% GDP) denoted by f1,2 and Trade Open. (% GDP) and
Fin. Open. denoted by f3,4. The last type are random effect base learners for a random intercept,
fintercept, and a random slope, fslope, with Ridge-penalized country-specific effects. We finally add
a global intercept such that the following additive model results
E[y|x] = β0 + f1 + . . .+ fp + f1,2 + f3,4 + fintercept + fslope (7)
The boosting algorithm minimizes the empirical risk which is given by
R := 1
n
n∑
i=1
L(yi, f(xi)) (8)
where (yi,xi) is one out of i = 1, . . . , n realizations of (y,x). The Huber-Loss, L, was chosen because
of its advantages in handling outliers compared with other approaches. The Huber-Loss is defined
as
L(y, f ; δ) =

1
2 (y − f)2 for |y − f | ≤ δ,
δ(|y − f | − δ2 ) for |y − f | > δ
(9)
and δ was chosen in each boosting iteration m by
δm = median(|yi − fˆm−1|, i = 1, ..., n)
The utilized gradient boosting algorithm then starts with an initial function estimate fˆ[0] and
proceeds in an stage-wise manner. At each iteration m it computes the negative gradient of the
loss function and updates the current function estimate fˆ∗[m]. Consequently, it descends along the
gradient of the empirical risk R whereby only one base learner is selected at each iteration for
updating the current function estimate. The decision when to stop the algorithm, mstop, is crucial.
It can be chosen arbitrarily. However, it has been commonly suggested to enforce a stop of the
algorithm before it converges to avoid overfitting and thus a suboptimal prediction.
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We first determined mstop by cross-validation techniques, where a 25-fold Bootstrap was used.
To take the longitudinal structure of our data into account this procedure was stratified by countries.
mstop was then chosen such that the mean of the empirical out-of-sample risk is minimized, whereby
the empirical risk is evaluated on the samples left out of the Boostrap-draws (Hothorn et al., 2018).
By stopping the algorithm before it converges, a shrinkage effect is imposed onto the effect estimates
of the model. When we applied this procedure to determine mstop, every specified base learner in
(7) was comprised. Owing to the shrinkage effect, we refitted the predictors associated with the base
learners as fixed effects in an AMM under the same specification that applied to the predictor sets
motivated by economic theory and specified in section 4.1. However, this refit failed owing to the
large quantity of selected parameters (and, thus, base learners). As a result, we enforced an early
stop of the boosting algorithm by setting mstop = 100. 100 iterations were the maximum number of
iterations that still lead to a successful estimation during the refit as an AMM. We made use of the
mboost package for the implementation (Hothorn et al., 2018).
5 Results
This section is organized in three subsections. In the first, we present the results of the first stage
selection as described in subsection 4.3. Ordered by theory, we present the winning models, M∗l ,
assessed by their cAIC and the resulting variables, discuss the linear links and plot the pattern of
the variables that exhibit non-linearities (together with their point-wise 95% confidence intervals).
Subsequently, we evaluate the existence of structural breaks in the wake of the financial crisis and
juxtapose the evidence of the pre-crisis period with that after the crisis. To this end we applied
the varying coefficient approach as defined in subsection 4.1. Finally, we discuss the results from
the boosted model, MB . The models included in M1, M5, M6, M7 and M8 were fitted on the
maximum of observations possible, implying 124 countries stretching from 1997 to 2015. Due to
data availability this is not the case for the estimates of institutional characteristics, M2, which
were fitted on 26 countries only and for a reduced time span from 2000 to 2012 at the first stage.
However, we refitted M∗2 on the full sample at the second stage since the predictors attached to
its predictor set, A14,2, are available for all 124 countries and all 19 points in time. The models
examining monetary policy strategy variables, M3, were fitted on 30 countries only and a reduced
time span from 1997 to 2012. The models examining potential effects from public finance,M4, were
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fitted on 80 countries stretching from 1997 to 2015. As a result, M∗3 and M
∗
4 were excluded from
the second stage selection since their predictors, A3,3 and A14,4, are not available to the full sample.
In the second subsection, we describe the second stage selection procedure for M∗1 , M
∗
2 , M
∗
5 , M
∗
6 ,
M∗7 , M
∗
8 and MB and identify the overall winning model, M
∗∗.
The third subsection finally provides a synthesis and interpretation of results. Based on theoret-
ical arguments and the lag structure underlying our estimates, we interpret the evidence in terms of
causality.
5.1 First Stage Selection
Money, Credit and Slack Table A.1 in the Table Appendix displays the results associated with
money, credit and slack, M1. The winning model (featuring the lowest cAIC value) is M4,1, which
exhibits the output gap and credit growth. The next best model, M1,1, also features the output gap
(and money growth). Hence, the output gap seems to be an important driver of inflation. Another
noteworthy result is that models including credit growth have higher empirical relevance than those
that account for money growth.
There is evidence of a linear and positive association between the output gap and inflation.
Widening the output gap by one percentage point leads to a log inflation increase of 0.012 (approxi-
mately 1.2 percent increase in inflation).24 However, the estimated effect of the output gap following
the crisis (an estimate of 0.008) has weakened relative to the pre-crisis period.
Credit growth affects inflation in a non-linear way (unlike the output gap), as indicated by an
EDF of about 2. However, although not estimated linearly, in the relevant range the effect of credit
growth is linear (Figure 3 panel a).25 Has the effect changed since the financial crisis? To answer
this question, we plot the effects before the crisis in panel b and those arising after the crisis in panel
c. As can be deduced from their comparison, the impact of credit growth was weak (around zero)
before the crisis and has remained weak since then. The widening of the confidence interval in the
post-crisis period suggests that the uncertainty in the estimation has somewhat increased.
24The details of results are available upon request.
25It becomes non linear outside the relevant range, which is not displayed.
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Figure 3: Estimated effects from winning model M4,1 over the whole sample (panel a), before the crisis
(panel b), after the crisis (panel c).
Institutions The winning model related to institutions is M14,2 (Table A.2 in the Table Ap-
pendix). It features civil liberties (next to money growth and GDP pc). The next best model
(M16,2) also exhibits civil liberties (along with credit growth and GDP pc). Again, models with
credit growth feature lower cAICs than the comparable models with money growth. Models includ-
ing the freedom status variable also do comparably well. By contrast, models including central bank
transparency or independence suggest a lower effect than civil rights or the freedom status.
In M14,2, two variables stand out by their low p-values, money growth and GDP pc. Both
are modeled linearly and have positive coefficients. The analysis of structural breaks shows that
the effect from money growth is stronger following the crisis, whereas the impact of GDP pc was
unaffected by it.
The coefficients on the variables proxying civil liberties exhibit larger p-values. No clear conclu-
sion between the pre- and post-crisis period can be drawn.
Central Bank independence and transparency have relatively weak explanatory power. The
benefit from using the turnover variable as an alternative measure of central bank independence
allowing for extending the set of observations could not be exploited because we had to restrict this
analysis to the intersecting set of countries and points in time.
Monetary Policy Strategies From the various variable combinations capturing effects from
monetary policy strategies, M3,3 is the model selected (Table A.3 in the Table Appendix). It
displays exchange-rate arrangements as important drivers of inflation (next to credit growth and
GDP growth). A general observation is that models including exchange-rate arrangements have
lower cAICs than the comparable models with inflation targeting. According to their p-values, credit
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growth and GDP growth exert the most relevant effect with a positive sign. A one percentage point
increase in credit growth pushes up log inflation by 0.00043 while a one percentage point additional
growth in real GDP causes log inflation to increase by 0.00685. The structural break analysis
suggests that both credit growth and GDP growth have strengthened their link with inflation in the
years following the crisis. Moreover, the transition from a situation with no legal tender, actually
a fixed exchange-rate regime, to free floating, leads to a reduction in inflation (although with high
uncertainty). No structural change is observed for exchange-rate regimes.
Public Finance The next results relate to public finance issues, M4. Here the winner is model
M14,4 (Table A.4 in the Table Appendix). In general, models that include money growth have a
lower cAIC than those with credit growth. It is also observable that public debt denomination plays
a role in affecting inflation (besides money growth and GDP pc). The maturity structure is less
relevant.
Money growth, GDP pc and debt denomination exhibit non-linear links with inflation, with EDFs
varying between 3 and 4, suggesting a cubic or even a relation of higher polynomial order. Figure
4 summarizes the results. It shows that increasingly lower negative money growth lowers inflation,
while positive money growth increasingly raises it (panel a). The comparison of the pre-crisis (panel
b) with the post-crisis (panel c) suggests a structural break. M2 growth has weakened its effect after
the crisis. As far as GDP pc is concerned (panel d), we infer that as long as it is below 10,000 USD,
it reduces inflation, if at all. Beyond this threshold, inflation rises strongly. Moreover, while in the
pre-crisis period (panel e) GDP pc led to hardly any effect on log inflation, since then its effect is in
line with the observation made across the whole sample period (panel f). Finally, when the share of
public and publicly guaranteed external long-term debt (PPG) issued in foreign currencies is low,
increasing its share pushes inflation up. At some point (roughly 20 %), a further issuance of foreign
currency debt tends to have (although with high uncertainty) an inflation reducing effect (panel
g). According to panel h, the link of foreign-currency debt and inflation in the pre-crisis period
corresponds to the observation obtained over the whole sample period. By contrast, since the crisis
(panel i), an increasing share of foreign-currency debt induces a rise in inflation (although subject
to high uncertainty).26
26Note, due to data availability, this evidence is obtained for observations of low and middle-income countries where
an effect may be more likely than in advanced countries.
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Figure 4: Estimated effects from winning model M14,4: Over the whole sample (first column), before the
crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
Globalization The next results are related to globalization,M5. The winning model M7,5 (Table
A.5 in the Table Appendix) features both globalization variables, financial openness and trade
openness (next to credit growth and GDP growth). The cAIC values suggest to model the two
globalization variables by two univariate terms and not one bivariate interaction term. Again,
models with credit growth yield lower cAIC values than the corresponding models with money
growth. Further, GDP growth affects inflation linearly. A one percentage point increase in GDP
growth boosts log inflation by 0.00513. Before the crisis its effect was very weakly negative with
large confidence intervals. Since then, inflation is strongly affected by economic growth. A one
percentage point increase in growth boosts log inflation by 0.0112.
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Turning to the non-linear effects, we estimated credit growth with EDF close to 2. However,
again, a linear and positive impact was observed in the relevant range (Figure 5, panel a). Panel b
and panel c illustrate the effects before and following the financial crisis, respectively. The results
are particularly interesting. While credit growth boosted inflation (weakly) before the crisis, in the
subsample following the crisis stronger credit growth has had an inflation reducing (although very
weak and highly uncertain) effect. By contrast, trade openness reduced inflation across the entire
time span (panel d). The inflation reducing effect of trade openness continued to hold after the crisis
(panel f). Panels g, h and i summarize the evidence of financial openness. Similar to trade openness,
the inflation abating effect of financial openness shows hardly any relevant changes across time.
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
(a)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
 
(b)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
 
(c)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
100 200 300 400
Trade Open. (% GDP)
(d)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
100 200 300 400
Trade Open. (% GDP)
 
(e)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
100 200 300 400
Trade Open. (% GDP)
 
(f)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.25 0.50 0.75
Fin. Open.
(g)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.25 0.50 0.75
Fin. Open.
 
(h)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.25 0.50 0.75
Fin. Open.
 
(i)
Figure 5: Estimated effects from winning model M7,5: Over the whole sample (first column), before the
crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
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Demography Which variable combination explains best a relationship between demography and
inflation? The answer is given by model M3,6 (Table A.6 in the Table Appendix), which includes
the share of the population older than or equal to 65 (next to credit growth and GDP growth).
Mostly, echoing previous findings, models with credit growth have lower cAICs than those with
money growth, while models with the share of population of 65 and older show lower cAIC values
than those with population aged 75 or more. The coefficient on GDP growth is again positive. A
one percentage point rise in income increases log inflation by 0.0051. Since the financial crisis, GDP
growth has a linear inflation enhancing effect with narrow confidence intervals. By contrast, in the
pre-crisis period, the impact was negative although with high uncertainty. This is in line with the
evidence of globalization. The next results relate to demographic changes. Estimated over the whole
sample period, an increasing share of population older than 65 leads to a reduction in inflation. A
one percentage point increase in the share of older population causes log inflation to diminish by
0.02. In contrast to GDP growth, demography does not show any structural break in the estimates.
Finally, credit growth indicates again a non-linear impact (EDF about 2). However, from Figure
6 it can be inferred that in the relevant range the effect was linear. Over the entire sample and before
the crisis, the effects are very similar (panel a and b). In the subsample limited to the post-crisis
period (panel c) credit growth had no influence on inflation anymore (inflation-lowering if at all).
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
(a)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
 
(b)
−0.2
0.0
0.2
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Credit (% GDP) Gr.
 
(c)
Figure 6: Estimated effects from winning model M3,6: Over the whole sample (left), before the crisis
(middle), after the crisis (right) labeled alphabetically
Natural Resources It results that model M9,7 is the winning model among the model combi-
nations related to natural resources, M7, (Table A.7 in the Table Appendix). It is composed of
credit growth, GDP growth as well as the interaction of energy prices (in USD) with energy rents
(% of GDP). Contrasting with the two globalization variables, the results in terms of cAIC always
show higher empirical relevance when energy rents interact with energy prices than when they en-
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ter as two univariate terms. GDP growth has again a linear effect on inflation. A one percentage
point increase raises log inflation by 0.0022. A structural break is again identified. While GDP
growth before the crisis had an inflation abating effect (although with high uncertainty), since then
it has raised inflation, similar to the evidence established in the winning models of demography and
globalization. A one percentage point increase in growth boosts log inflation by 0.0056.
By contrast, credit growth and the interaction of energy prices with rents impact inflation in a
non-linear way (EDFs of about 2 and 16, respectively). As can be seen in Figure 7, credit growth
enhanced inflation estimated over the whole period and during the period before the crisis (panel
a and b). However, as can be gleaned from panel c, credit growth had no impact after the crisis
anymore, similar to the evidence found in the winning model relating to demography.
Panels d, e and f illustrate the bivariate interaction effects between energy rents and energy
prices by means of contour plots. A contour plot shows the relationship between energy rents (X
variable), energy prices (Y variable) and log inflation. The passage from a blue to a green area
denotes decreasing inflation. Conversely, the passage from a green to a blue area indicates mounting
inflationary pressure. The black contour (iso-effect value) lines serve as guidance for the strength of
effects. Along the same line the interaction effect is unchanged.
From panel d, which exhibits the results obtained from the estimation across the entire sample
period, it can be observed that low values of both exogenous variables have a comparably weak
effect on levels of inflation (lower left-hand corner). However, when energy rents are high, increasing
energy prices leads to an acceleration of inflation, especially when energy prices are very low. By
contrast, when energy rents are constant at a low level, increasing energy prices boost inflation as
well but less strongly.
Panels e and f illustrate the effects from the interaction of energy prices with energy rents in the
pre- and post-crisis period. While the pre-crisis effect (panel e) is similar to the result obtained for
the entire sample period (panel d), since the crisis (panel f) the impact from this interaction has
clearly changed. The combination of increasing energy prices while holding energy rents at a high
level, which previously pushed inflation, has even intensified its effect since the crisis.27
27Or, seen from another perspective, for high energy prices, energy rents do not seem to affect inflation. For low
energy prices, however, increasing energy rents lead to decreasing inflation
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Figure 7: Estimated effects from winning model M9,7: Over the whole sample (first column), before the
crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
Past Inflation The winning model capturing effects from past inflation is M3,8 (together with
credit growth and GDP growth and shown in Table A.8 in the Table Appendix). Whether the model
with money growth or the comparable model with credit growth in it does better, cannot be told.
Models including M2 growth do not strictly outperform models including credit growth in terms of
their cAIC values. The parametric coefficient of GDP growth suggests that a one percentage point
increase in growth pushes log inflation by 0.0078. This model also exhibits structural breaks. The
linear effect from GDP has again increased after the crisis compared with the pre-crisis period. Since
then, a one percentage point growth increase has pushed log inflation by 0.013.
As displayed in Figure 8, credit growth and past inflation exhibit non-linear effects, although
credit growth is again linear in the relevant range. From panel a and b, which plot the patterns
based on the whole sample and for the period preceding the financial crisis, respectively, it can
be seen that the inflation-raising effect from credit growth has not changed. By contrast, panel c
suggests that since the crisis credit growth no longer impacted inflation. Finally, there is no evidence
of a break in the effect from past to current inflation between the estimates on the whole sample
and the pre-crisis subsample (panel d and e). However, since the financial crisis past inflation has
strengthened its effect (panel f).
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Figure 8: Estimated effects from winning model M3,8: Over the whole sample (first column), before the
crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
Boosting Model The boosting algorithm would select all variables.28 To avoid this and to obtain
only the most relevant drivers, we forced the algorithm to stop at an earlier point. The boosting
approach, which to a great extent is removed from theoretical motivation, yields a negligible linear
effect of the level of M2 relative to GDP. This did not change when the structural break was taken
into account. M2 (% of GDP) is the only variable to be modeled linearly.
Figure 9 and 10 present the results for the non-linear effects for the variables selected. Note,
the boosting model has chosen Credit (% GDP) and not Credit (% GDP) Gr. from among the four
credit variables. Panel a plots the results across the whole time span. It exhibits a convex effect
of domestic credit to the private sector in percent of GDP which was estimated with an EDF of
about 3. When Credit (% GDP) is low, an increase in credit creation reduces inflation. Beyond
a level of 150%, additional credit creation leads to an increasingly higher inflation. Panel b and c
compare the pre- with the post-crisis period. The inflation-diminishing effects of Credit (% GDP)
holds throughout time.29
28For the boosting algorithm we added two more credit variables, one captures domestic credit by the financial
sector in percent of GDP (Credit Fin. (% of GDP) and the other its growth rate (Credit Fin. (% of GDP) Growth),
as well as M2 (% of GDP).
29As pointed out above, in some of the winning models we detected some evidence of a changing effect from credit
growth on inflation since the financial crisis.
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The next variable chosen by the boosting algorithm is GDP pc (USD). Panel d shows that its
expansion lowers inflation with an EDF of about 3.5. Up to GDP pc of 25,000 USD the effect is
negative. From 25,000 it levels off. The inflation-decreasing influence of GDP pc (USD) has hardly
changed between the pre- and post-crisis period (panel e and f).
The evidence of energy prices estimated over the whole sample is displayed in panel g (EDF of 5).
An increase in energy prices is conducive to rising inflation. However, once the energy price reaches
a level of about 110 USD, a further rise causes inflation to fall. Energy prices did impact inflation
differently in the two subperiods (panel h and i). Before the crisis, higher energy prices would have
no effect up to 75 USD. Beyond this price, the variable has a diminishing effect on inflation, although
the effects are measured with high uncertainty. After the crisis, the picture changes drastically. Until
a price of 60 USD, energy prices lowered inflation. In the range between 60 and 80 USD energy
prices push inflation up.
Panels j to l emphasizes the importance of interacting energy prices with energy rents, echoing
the results of M9,7. The effect from the interaction of energy prices and rents has visibly changed
(panel l and m) across time. Before the crisis it is in line with the effect seen in panel k. At first
sight, it seems that after the crisis, the interaction effect has strongly weakened, in stark contrast
with the results from M9,7. However, this is arguably explained by the univariate modeling of energy
prices whose effect has strongly changed since the financial crisis (panel i) and was not included in
M9,7.
Panel m echoes the evidence of the inflation-enhancing effect arising from past inflation from
M3,8. As the comparison of panel n and o suggests, past inflation has strengthened its effect after
the crisis, again echoing M3,8.
Finally, from panel p, q and r, we infer an unambiguous inflation-boosting impact of money
growth. This seems to be driven by observations after the crisis.
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Figure 9: Estimated effects from a model-based boosting algorithm: Over the whole sample (first column),
before the crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
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Figure 10: Estimated effects from a model-based boosting algorithm: Over the whole sample (first column),
before the crisis (second column), after the crisis (third column) labeled alphabetically and row-wise.
Time Effects Finally, from figure 11, which plots the time effects (i.e. trends) associated with
the boosted and the winning models, two observations can be made. First, the time effects are
roughly the same across models. Second, a falling time trend in inflation is estimated consistently
and corresponds with the pattern of global inflation seen in Figure 1. Note that the winning models
M3,3 and M14,4 were fitted on a subset of data and are thus not included in panel c. The time
patterns arising from the two models are shown in panel a and b. The general downward trend is
confirmed.
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Figure 11: Estimated effects of the variable Year from model M3,3 (panel a left), M14,4 (panel b middle)
and all first stage winners (panel c right)
5.2 Second Stage Selection
This subsection presents the overall winning model, M∗∗. A second stage selection had to be
conducted since first stage winners referring to institutions, monetary policy strategies and public
finance, i.e. models Mj,2, Mj,3 and Mj,4, are based on a lower number of countries and a reduced
time span. Hence, their Likelihood and thus their cAICs cannot be directly compared with the other
five winning models and the model selected by the boosting algorithm. However, since the variables
attached to the winning model from the comparison of institutional variables are also available for
the full sample, model M14,2 can now be refitted to the full sample and is considered in the second
stage selection.30 By contrast, M3,3 and M14,4 are excluded from this stage since their corresponding
variables are only available for either a subset of countries or a limited time span. This leaves us
with six winning models motivated by economic theory and a (atheoretical) model selected by the
boosting algorithm.
Overall Winner The comparison among theory-based winning models yields M9,7 as the overall
best model. It does also better than the boosted model, although the latter comes in second best.
From this evidence we conclude that the interaction of prices and rents of natural resources put
forward by model M9,7 are fundamental drivers of inflation, in association with credit (% GDP)
growth and GDP growth. Both enter linearly and suggest a comparably weak positive impact on
log inflation. The results in terms of cAIC always show higher empirical relevance when energy
rents interact with energy prices than when they enter as two univariate terms. Moreover, their
30The effects of the refit of M14,2 on the full sample are available upon request.
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interacting effect is highly non-linear. The boosting algorithm supports this finding but emphasizes
the importance of energy prices as a driver of inflation.
In addition, we computed the cAIC for models that do not contain any economic variable at all
(that is, no fixed effects other than time) and found a substantially higher cAIC for these models
compared to every other model comprised by the first and second stage selection.
5.3 Synthesis
Overall, we estimated 91 models and 40 explanatory variables and uncovered several interesting
results. First, we detected linear but also several non-linear links, adding new perspectives on how
inflation evolves. Second, we found evidence that corroborates the importance of some variables
suggested in the literature as drivers of global inflation over the last two decades. Other variables,
which in previous research were found to be important in this regard, exert comparably little influence
on inflation. Third, we uncovered some important structural breaks since the financial crisis. We
summarize the main findings and give them an economic interpretation in what follows.
(i) A first result is that credit growth is more often part of the winning model than money growth,
especially in estimations on the full sample of observations. Credit creation raises inflation, although
rather weakly. There is some evidence that this pattern has further weakened since the financial
crisis, or has even turned negative. The latter may suggest the existence of excess production
capacities built up in preceding decades. By contrast, when money growth was selected as important,
the link to inflation was positive, close to linear and stronger than from credit growth. This pattern
has not changed with the crisis. The fact that credit growth is more important than money growth
is arguably due to the fact that M2 money growth may fluctuate strongly across interest-rate cycles
and at times even shrink.
(ii) The next finding relates to real GDP pc. In the literature it has sometimes been used as a
proxy for the quality of a country’s institutions. Accordingly, the higher it is, the lower inflation
may be. We find results corroborating this presumption. This effect is non-linear and has weakened
over time. However, when estimated on data limited to 80 low and middle income countries, we
detected a highly non-linear relationship – a negative effect until 10,000 USD and a strong positive
impact beyond. Before the crisis GDP pc had almost no effect in these countries.
(iii) Real GDP growth exerts a linear and positive effect across models. In addition, it exhibits
some changes since the financial crisis. While its effect on inflation in the period preceding the
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financial crisis was negligible but highly uncertain, since then the evidence points to a clear inflation-
boosting effect. Real GDP growth turned out to be more often part of the winning model than GDP
pc, emphasizing its relative importance.
(iv) The output gap is positively and linearly associated with inflation in line with the Phillips
curve. However, its effect has weakened after the financial crisis, in keeping with recent research
pointing to a flattening of the Phillips curve.31
(v) The next outcome pertains to political forces, e.g. political rights and freedom status, and
central-bank related variables, such as transparency and independence. They turned out to be less
relevant. None features in any winning model – except for civil liberties – and their partial effects
are weak. However, the results are derived – due to data limitations – from 26 countries only.
(vi) The evidence from the analysis of monetary policy strategies is also straightforward. Exchange-
rate arrangements are more successful in explaining inflation than inflation targeting. However, this
evidence is based on a sample comprising 30 countries only.
(vii) From the long list of theoretical explanations establishing a causal link between public debt
or its management and inflation, only the denomination of external debt seems to matter. The
analysis was restricted to a set of low and middle income countries due to data availability, actually
to those where these effects are arguably more likely. Increasing the share of foreign-currency debt
displays an interesting non-linear pattern. Overall, and in line with debt-management models focused
on time-inconsistency problems, the higher the share of debt issued in a foreign currency, the lower
inflation is. However, as long as its share is below the threshold of roughly 20%, rising its share
pushes inflation up. After the crisis, increasing the share of foreign currency debt boosts inflation
constantly, although the evidence is subject to high uncertainty. One possible explanation for this
result is that the more debt is issued in a form that protects investors from unexpected inflation,
the higher inflation is required to achieve a debt reduction in real terms on the remaining share of
nominal debt. By contrast, the maturity structure is not relevant in our setting, in line with the
benchmark model which postulates the neutrality of debt maturity.32
(viii) The effects of globalization are non-linear and relevant. The more open economies are, the
lower inflation, although petering out with increasing openness. This link has not been affected by
31Real GDP growth assesses the link between inflation and real activity. However, although not directly a measure
of slack, it correlates strongly with measures of slack. See Gross and Semmler (2017). Hence, if GDP growth is
regarded as a proxy for the output gap, the latter’s effect has strengthened after the crisis.
32See Missale (1999).
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the financial crisis. Moreover, there is no evidence that an interplay between financial and trade
openness affects inflation.
(ix) The ageing of the population is deflationary and linear. This holds particularly for the age
cohorts above 65. No structural break was identified. However, the results applying to demography
reveal that it plays a minor role compared to its competitors.
(x) We found particularly compelling evidence concerning natural resources. Energy prices, basi-
cally oil prices, and energy rents are jointly drivers which exert highly non-linear effects. The overall
winning model in terms of cAIC includes this interaction (besides credit growth and GDP growth).
The boosting algorithm also chooses this interaction term; in addition it suggests a particular role
for energy prices. Energy rents by themselves do not seem to be as important. This result highlights
the relevance of commodity prices as determinants of inflation. After the crisis the effect arising
from the interaction of energy prices and rents on inflation has even increased.
(xi) Another clear result concerns past inflation and corroborates the theoretical predictions from
past on current inflation. The higher inflation was in the past, the higher current inflation is. This
relation is non-linear and seems to have strengthened after the crisis.
(xii) Each model includes either M2 Gr. (%) or Credit (% GDP) Gr. in combination with either
GDP pc (USD) or GDP Gr. (%). However, it is important to note that theory-specific explanatory
variables often yielded the strongest effects suggesting that they represent the major contributors
to the model’s empirical relevance.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the literature on what determines inflation and how. Based on the
vast literature we estimated a large quantity of macro, institutional and political variables on a
sample of 124 countries at different stages of development stretching from 1997 to 2015. Both the
comprehensive cross-country data set and the covered period are of particular interest for three
reasons. First, this period is characterized by a falling inflation trend that prompted central banks
in advanced countries even to take measures to avert too low inflation rates. Second, exploiting data
from countries at different stages of economic development helps mitigate potential biases arising
from the selection of countries in the sample. Third, the inclusion of observations following the
financial crisis allow for the examination of potential structural changes in its wake.
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From a methodical viewpoint we adopted an estimation approach that has not been used before in
empirical analysis of inflation. Specifically, we employed additive mixed models selected by cAIC to
identify model winners from among eight economic theories. Additive mixed models present various
features particularly suitable for our dataset, especially allowing us to account for both countries’
heterogeneity and non-linearities.
Many interesting results, with some important implications for monetary policy, in particular,
emerge from our analysis. The most important result highlights natural resources as the main
drivers of inflation. Energy prices, mainly oil prices, become a strong non-linear source of inflation
when they interact with high energy rents. From a policy-making point of view this suggests that
for assessing their impact it is important to consider their joint effect. Another relevant driver is
represented by country openness which lowers inflation. The next finding relates to credit growth,
which central banks have tried to stimulate after the financial crisis to raise inflation. Our results
suggest that inflation was hardly affected by credit expansion. There is even some (weak) evidence
that credit growth led to lower inflation. This suggests that policies aimed at boosting credits have
the potential to backfire. Another finding is that countries experience higher inflation when they
experience higher growth rates. Hence, in countries with an inflation rate deemed to be too low,
policies aimed at inducing (real) economic growth are likely to be more successful than monetary
policy measures aimed at stimulating credits. A further result which has policy relevance is that
output gap effects are in line with the Phillips curve theory. However, after the crisis its effect has
abated. GDP pc which may proxy cross-country differences in institutions contributes to lowering
inflation. In low and lower-middle income countries this inflation reducing effect is reversed beyond
a certain level of income.
As far as past inflation is concerned, we find that is pushes inflation up. By contrast, the ageing
of society tends to be deflationary. However, both past inflation and demographic changes are
comparably less important explanatory variables. The degree of transparency and the independence
of central banks, as well as political events, except for civil liberties, are the least important drivers.
Finally, in a subset of countries public debt related measures, except for currency denomination,
are not notable drivers of inflation. The effect from the introduction of an inflation-targeting regime
is negligible compared to the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate.
A further important result relates to the existence of several structural breaks after the financial
crisis which may have implications for inflation forecasting models.
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The analysis could be extended along several dimensions. For instance, additional explanatory
variables that specifically account for potential globalization effects may be envisaged. Another
could be a separation of countries according to their stage of economic development. For forecast-
ing purposes other computer-aided modeling approaches could be employed building on the results
uncovered in this paper. Furthermore, methods of causal inference could contribute to our under-
standing of causal connections. Finally, another potential venue for future research is a more explicit
consideration of the model selection uncertainty. The confidence intervals presented in this analy-
sis may yield a different coverage probability when the selection uncertainty is taken into account.
To our knowledge, feasible solutions for our selection procedure have not been developed for addi-
tive and mixed models yet. However, we are working on how to properly incorporate the selection
procedure in the model inference.
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A Table Appendix
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 cAIC
M1,1 M2 Gr. (%) Out. Gap (%) Year -1159.24
M2,1 M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1124.25
M3,1 M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1084.4
M4,1 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Out. Gap (%) Year -1168.57
M5,1 Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Year -1135.14
M6,1 Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Year -1105.17
Winner M4,1
Table A.1: Models for Money, Credit and Slack
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 cAIC
M1,2 M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year CBT -393.69
M2,2 M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year CBT -392.27
M3,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Year CBT -395.57
M4,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP pc (USD) Year CBT -394.78
M5,2 Pol. Orien. Pol. Orien. : Pol.
Stab.
M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Pol. Stab. Year -401.68
M6,2 Pol. Orien. Pol. Orien. : Pol.
Stab.
M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Pol. Stab. Year -397.48
M7,2 Pol. Orien. Pol. Orien. : Pol.
Stab.
Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Pol. Stab. Year -402.67
M8,2 Pol. Orien. Pol. Orien. : Pol.
Stab.
Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP pc
(USD)
Pol. Stab. Year -397.8
M9,2 M2 Gr. (%) Pol. Rights GDP Gr. (%) Year -399.79
M10,2 M2 Gr. (%) Pol. Rights GDP pc
(USD)
Year -398
M11,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Pol. Rights GDP Gr. (%) Year -401.72
M12,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Pol. Rights GDP pc
(USD)
Year -399.54
M13,2 Civil Lib. M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -388.92
M14,2 Civil Lib. M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Year -480.66
M15,2 Civil Lib. Credit (% GDP)
Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Year -393.18
M16,2 Civil Lib. Credit (% GDP)
Gr.
GDP pc
(USD)
Year -412.54
M17,2 M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Fr. Status Year -405.96
M18,2 M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Fr. Status Year -404.09
M19,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP pc (USD) Fr. Status Year -404.55
M20,2 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Fr. Status Year -407.99
M21,2 CBI M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year TOR TOR : CBI -396.45
M22,2 CBI M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Year TOR TOR : CBI -392.89
M23,2 CBI Credit (% GDP)
Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Year TOR TOR : CBI -398.46
M24,2 CBI Credit (% GDP)
Gr.
GDP pc
(USD)
Year TOR TOR : CBI -394.25
Winner M14,2
Table A.2: Models for Institutions
59
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 cAIC
M1,3 ERA M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -387.41
M2,3 ERA M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -369.11
M3,3 Credit (% GDP) Gr. ERA GDP Gr. (%) Year -387.82
M4,3 Credit (% GDP) Gr. ERA GDP pc (USD) Year -364.69
M5,3 M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Infl. Targ. Year -382.3
M6,3 M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Infl. Targ. Year -363.75
M7,3 Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Infl. Targ. Year -382.38
M8,3 Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Infl. Targ. Year -360.86
Winner M3,3
Table A.3: Models for Monetary Policy Strategy
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 cAIC
M1,4 Debt (% GDP) Gr. M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -115.2
M2,4 Debt (% GDP) Gr. M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -139.5
M3,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Debt (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Year -102.6
M4,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Debt (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Year -118.48
M5,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -113.23
M6,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -136.15
M7,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Year -101.24
M8,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Year -124.76
M9,4 M2 Gr. (%) Matur. GDP Gr. (%) Year -106.39
M10,4 M2 Gr. (%) Matur. GDP pc (USD) Year -133.45
M11,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Matur. GDP Gr. (%) Year -94.41
M12,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Matur. GDP pc (USD) Year -112.11
M13,4 Denom. (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -124.52
M14,4 Denom. (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -144.78
M15,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Denom. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -118.75
M16,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Denom. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -138.81
Winner M14,4
Table A.4: Models for Public Finance
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 cAIC
M1,5 Fin. Open. M2 Gr. (%) Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1142.92
M2,5 Fin. Open. M2 Gr. (%) Trade Open. (%
GDP)
Trade Open. (%
GDP) : Fin.
Open.
GDP Gr.
(%)
Year -1144.36
M3,5 Fin. Open. /
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1119.75
M4,5 Fin. Open. M2 Gr. (%) Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP pc (USD) Year -1131.38
M5,5 Fin. Open. M2 Gr. (%) Trade Open. (%
GDP)
Trade Open. (%
GDP) : Fin.
Open.
GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1118.88
M6,5 Fin. Open. /
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1108.41
M7,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1153.57
M8,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. Fin. Open. /
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP Gr.
(%)
Year -1101.08
M9,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. /
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1126.73
M10,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP pc (USD) Year -1137.84
M11,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. Trade Open. (%
GDP)
Trade Open. (%
GDP) : Fin.
Open.
GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1139.05
M12,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. /
Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP pc (USD) Year -1124.08
Winner M7,5
Table A.5: Models for Globalization
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 cAIC
M1,6 Age 65 (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1129.08
M2,6 Age 65 (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1119.87
M3,6 Age 65 (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Year -1138.59
M4,6 Age 65 (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Year -1113.15
M5,6 Age 75 (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1117.79
M6,6 Age 75 (%) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1108.93
M7,6 Age 75 (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%) Year -1128.69
M8,6 Age 75 (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD) Year -1111.79
Winner M3,6
Table A.6: Models for Demography
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Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 cAIC
M1,7 En. Prices (USD) En. Rents (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1285.26
M2,7 En. Prices (USD) En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
En. Rents (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1313.55
M3,7 En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1344.12
M4,7 En. Prices (USD) En. Rents (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1267.66
M5,7 En. Prices (USD) En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
En. Rents (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1297.25
M6,7 En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1326.71
M7,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) En. Rents (% GDP) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1285.48
M8,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
En. Rents (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1313.39
M9,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1346.36
M10,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) En. Rents (% GDP) GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1260.36
M11,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
En. Rents (%
GDP)
GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1291.18
M12,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr. En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
GDP pc (USD) Year -1325.29
Winner M9,7
Table A.7: Models for Natural Resources
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 cAIC
M1,8 M2 Gr. (%) Past Infl. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1134.03
M2,8 M2 Gr. (%) Past Infl. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1107.64
M3,8 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Past Infl. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1137.22
M4,8 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Past Infl. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1106.34
Winner M3,8
Table A.8: Models for Past Inflation
Term 1 Term 2 Term 3 Term 4 Term 5 Term 6 Term 7 Term 8 cAIC
M4,1 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Out. Gap (%) Year -1168.57
M14,2 Civil Lib. M2 Gr. (%) GDP pc (USD) Year -1076.36
M7,5 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Fin. Open. Trade Open. (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1153.57
M3,6 Age 65 (%) Credit (% GDP)
Gr.
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1138.59
M9,7 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
En. Prices (USD)
/ En. Rents (%
GDP)
GDP Gr. (%) Year -1346.36
M3,8 Credit (%
GDP) Gr.
Past Infl. (%) GDP Gr. (%) Year -1137.22
MB Credit (% of
GDP)
En. Prices (USD) En. Prices (USD)
/ En. Rents (%
GDP)
M2 (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%) Past Infl. (%) GDP pc
(USD)
Year -1322.87
Winner M9,7
Table A.9: Comparison of Winning Models on the Second Stage
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Bj,l Cj,l Dj,l Ej,l
A1,1 Out. Gap (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A2,1 GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A3,1 M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A4,1 Out. Gap (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year
A5,1 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year
A6,1 Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year
A1,2 M2 Gr. (%), CBT GDP Gr. (%), Year
A2,2 M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD) CBT, Year
A3,2 Credit (% GDP) Gr., CBT GDP Gr. (%), Year
A4,2 Credit (% GDP) Gr., CBT, GDP pc (USD) Year
A5,2 Pol. Orien., Pol. Stab., M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%), Year Pol. Orien. : Pol. Stab.
A6,2 Pol. Orien., Pol. Stab., M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc
(USD)
Year Pol. Orien. : Pol. Stab.
A7,2 Pol. Orien., Pol. Stab., Credit (% GDP) Gr.,
GDP Gr. (%)
Year Pol. Orien. : Pol. Stab.
A8,2 Pol. Orien., Pol. Stab., Credit (% GDP) Gr.,
GDP pc (USD)
Year Pol. Orien. : Pol. Stab.
A9,2 M2 Gr. (%), Pol. Rights GDP Gr. (%), Year
A10,2 M2 Gr. (%), Pol. Rights, GDP pc (USD) Year
A11,2 Pol. Rights, Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A12,2 Pol. Rights, Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc
(USD), Credit (% GDP) Gr.
Year
A13,2 Civil Lib., M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%), Year
A14,2 Civil Lib., M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD) Year
A15,2 Civil Lib., Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A16,2 Civil Lib., Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc
(USD)
Year
A17,2 Fr. Status, M2 Gr. (%) GDP Gr. (%), Year
A18,2 Fr. Status, M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD) Year
A19,2 Fr. Status, Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc
(USD)
Year
A20,2 Fr. Status, Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A21,2 M2 Gr. (%), CBI, TOR GDP Gr. (%), Year TOR : CBI
A22,2 M2 Gr. (%), CBI, TOR, GDP pc (USD) Year TOR : CBI
A23,2 Credit (% GDP) Gr., CBI, TOR GDP Gr. (%), Year TOR : CBI
A24,2 Credit (% GDP) Gr., CBI, TOR, GDP pc
(USD)
Year TOR : CBI
A1,3 ERA, GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A2,3 ERA M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A3,3 ERA, Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP Gr. (%) Year
A4,3 ERA, Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD), Year
A5,3 Infl. Targ., GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A6,3 Infl. Targ. GDP pc (USD), M2 Gr. (%), Year
A7,3 Infl. Targ., GDP Gr. (%), Credit (% GDP) Gr. Year
A8,3 Infl. Targ., Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD), Year
A1,4 Debt (% GDP) Gr. M2 Gr. (%), GDP Gr. (%), Year
A2,4 Debt (% GDP) Gr. M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A3,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr., Debt (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A4,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr, Debt (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD), Year
A5,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%), GDP Gr. (%), Year
A6,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP) M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A7,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP), Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A8,4 Prim. Bal. (% GDP), Credit (% GDP) Gr. GDP pc (USD), Year
A9,4 Matur. M2 Gr. (%), GDP Gr. (%), Year
A10,4 Matur. M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A11,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr., Matur. GDP Gr. (%), Year
A12,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr., Matur. GDP pc (USD), Year
A13,4 Denom. (%), M2 Gr. (%), GDP Gr. (%), Year
A14,4 Denom. (%), M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD),
Year
A15,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Denom. (%), GDP Gr. (%), Year
A16,4 Credit (% GDP) Gr. Denom. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
Table A.10: (1/2) Allocation of the predictor set Aj,l of the model Mj,l to Bj,l,Cj,l, Dj,l and Ej,l
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Bj,l Cj,l Dj,l Ej,l
A1,5 GDP Gr. (%) Fin. Open., M2 Gr. (%), Trade Open. (%
GDP), Year
A2,5 Trade Open. (% GDP), GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Fin. Open., Year Trade Open. (% GDP) :
Fin. Open.
A3,5 GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A4,5 Fin. Open., M2 Gr. (%), Trade Open. (%
GDP), GDP pc (USD), Year
A5,5 Trade Open. (% GDP) Fin. Open., M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year Trade Open. (% GDP) :
Fin. Open.
A6,5 M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A7,5 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Fin. Open., Trade Open.
(% GDP), Year
A8,5 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Fin. Open., Trade Open.
(% GDP), Year
Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A9,5 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A10,5 GDP pc (USD), Credit (% GDP) Gr., Fin.
Open., Trade Open. (% GDP), Year
Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A11,5 Trade Open. (% GDP) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Fin. Open., GDP pc
(USD), Year
Trade Open. (% GDP) :
Fin. Open.
A12,5 Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year Fin. Open. / Trade Open.
(% GDP)
A1,6 Age 65 (%), GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A2,6 Age 65 (%) M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A3,6 Age 65 (%), GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year
A4,6 Age 65 (%), GDP pc (USD) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year
A5,6 Age 75 (%), GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year
A6,6 Age 75 (%) M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A7,6 Age 75 (%), GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year
A8,6 Age 75 (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year
A1,7 GDP Gr. (%) En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), M2
Gr. (%), Year
A2,7 GDP Gr. (%) En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), M2
Gr. (%), Year
En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A3,7 GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Year En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A4,7 En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), M2
Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
A5,7 En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), M2
Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year
En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A6,7 M2 Gr. (%), GDP pc (USD), Year En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A7,7 GDP Gr. (%) En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), Credit
(% GDP) Gr., Year
A8,7 GDP Gr. (%) En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), Credit
(% GDP) Gr., Year
En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A9,7 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Year En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A10,7 En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), Credit
(% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year
A11,7 En. Prices (USD), En. Rents (% GDP), Credit
(% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year
En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A12,7 Credit (% GDP) Gr., GDP pc (USD), Year En. Prices (USD) / En.
Rents (% GDP)
A1,8 GDP Gr. (%) M2 Gr. (%), Past Infl. (%), Year
A2,8 M2 Gr. (%), Past Infl. (%), GDP pc (USD),
Year
A3,8 GDP Gr. (%) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Past Infl. (%), Year
A4,8 GDP pc (USD) Credit (% GDP) Gr., Past Infl. (%), Year
Table A.11: (2/2) Allocation of the predictor set Aj,l of the model Mj,l to Bj,l,Cj,l, Dj,l and Ej,l
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B Literature Appendix
In this section we offer a comprehensive overview of the most common explanations of inflation, beginning by one of the
most established folk wisdoms in monetary economics. It postulates a relationship between long-run monetary growth and
long-run inflation. This is the background underlying the belief that inflation is generally said to be a monetary phenomenon.
Traditional monetarists support the strict view that non-monetary factors are irrelevant in determining inflation. According
to the P*-model that tends to revive the traditional monetary view, inflation results from monetary growth; demand and
supply shocks have no roles to play.
However, in criticizing the pure monetarist view, Kuttner (1990) noted that although some measure of money (possibly
M2) may be the main determinant of inflation in the long run, it does not follow that only money matters in determining
inflation over all horizons. In this vein a number of empirical studies show that the sources of inflation are quite diverse
and include a country’s institutional set-up, the monetary policy strategy in place, fiscal imbalances, effects of globalization,
demographic changes, (shocks to) prices of natural resources, as well as past inflation. We will discuss them in turn and
present a selection of empirical studies.
B.1 Money, Credit and Slack
B.1.1 Money
A key macroeconomic axiom is the quantity theory of money. It posits a proportional relation between inflation and the
growth rate of money (but no effect of a permanent increase in money growth on output and velocity). Numerous studies
confirm that sustained high growth rates of a nation’s money stock in excess of its production of goods and services eventually
produce high and rising inflation rates. For instance, Batini and Nelson (2001) show a relationship between inflation and
money growth on UK and US data for the period 1953-2001. Studies involving international cross-sections of countries are,
among others, De Grauwe and Polan (2005) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2007). De Grauwe and Polan (2005)
control for the level of inflation and report long-run (1969-1999) cross-section evidence of a strong (although not proportional)
positive relation between the long-run growth rate of money and the rise in CPI inflation for 159 countries. However, this
link is practically completely due to the presence of high-inflation or hyperinflation countries. Recent studies, for instance,
Hillinger et al. (2015), and Teles et al. (2016) confirm the quantity theory of money also in countries with low inflation.
However, the long-run link between money growth and inflation has weakened in low inflation countries, especially after
the Great Inflation period. Gallegati et al. (2019) document in a wavelet-based exploratory analysis covering 16 developed
countries and spanning 140 years a close relationship between excess money growth and inflation over time horizons between
16 and 24 years.
B.1.2 Credit
Another variable that is related to money is credit creation. The reason for distinguishing between money supply and credit
growth is given by the decoupling of the two since the 1980s (Schularick and Taylor (2012). In previous work (Caldero´n and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2010)), domestic credit to private sector to GDP has been seen as a proxy of financial depth and as such
containing information that is expected to be negatively related to inflation.33 First, financial depth may be seen as a measure
33Other authors, for example, Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), measure financial depth by the ratio of M2 to GDP.
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of the institutional quality of a country. Second, the more developed financial markets are, the easier it is for a government
to finance temporary (and sustainable) deficits through borrowing from national residents, making it less likely to incur in
seigniorage-based revenue. Third, a financial sector’s opposition to inflation could have an additional price-dampening effect.
Posen (1995) argues that the opposition to inflation from the financial sector, which reflects the financial sector’s distaste
for inflation and its ability to express that distaste, is a significant predictor of inflation. In addition, a credit expansion
that leads to a build-up investment and capacities for production will put downward pressure on prices. By contrast, an
inflation-raising effect may arise from credit expansion that go hand in hand with money creation.
B.1.3 Slack
A further central tenet of macroeconomics is that the real and nominal sides of the economy are linked through a Phillips
curve relationship, in which inflationary pressures reflect the level of real economic activity and inflationary expectations.
Two specifications have arisen over time: the Traditional (or New Classical) and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In the
New Classical form, inflation is a function of lagged expected inflation and a contemporaneous measure of excess demand,
often measured by the output gap, defined as actual minus potential output. The parameter on excess demand indicates the
degree to which prices are flexible. According to this form, inflation will tend to rise if the gap is positive, while it will tend
to fall as long as the gap is negative. If the output gap is zero, inflation will remain stable.
The New Keynesian approach predicts that there should exist a short-run Phillips Curve that relates some measure of
economic activity to inflation.34 This approach posits that a deviation of an economy’s actual output from its potential level
as a result of an excess demand in an overheated economy (positive output gap) will engineer inflation. 35 Empirical support
for the output (unemployment) gap model is provided by a number of studies.36 However, inflation seems to have become
less responsive to measures of the domestic output gap than in the past, as documented by Roberts (2006). The Phillips
Curve has become less steep. Blanchard (2016) found that a drop in the unemployment rate in the US has less than a third
as much power to raise inflation as it did in the mid-1970s. A number of recent papers have pointed out that inflation can be
approximated (and forecast) by statistical processes unrelated to the amount of slack in the economy. Dotsey et al. (2018)
is representative of the papers that have documented this. The empirical disconnect between inflation and various measures
of slack has been interpreted by some commentators as evidence that the Phillips curve has weakened or even disappeared
(Ball and Mazumder (2011).37
An important question is whether the financial crisis of 2008-2009 led to structural breaks. One particular point in case
concerns the Phillips curve.38 The background is the missing disinflation which was observed in advanced economies in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. Several hypotheses have been advanced. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) suggest that
firms inflation expectations moved countercyclically during the recession and recovery because they are overly influenced by
oil prices, which increased from 2009 to 2011 – and extending their argument39 – fell from 2014 through 2017. A second set
34See, for instance, Gali and Gertler (2007).
35Actually, the literature has developed a third approach – the Hybrid Phillips curve, according to which inflation depends on currently expected
future inflation as well as lagged realized price changes, together with contemporaneous economic slack. The impulse-response pattern of inflation
to output gap changes in the New Keynesian Phillips curve are opposite to those postulated by the New Classical approach. See Carlin and Soskice
(2015).
36See, for instance, Coe and McDermott (1997), Clark and McCracken (2006), Deniz et al. (2016), Gross and Semmler (2017), and Jasova et al.
(2019).
37See Stock and Watson (2019) and McLeay and Tenreyro (2019) for a different view.
38See McLeay and Tenreyro (2019) and Hooper et al. (2019) provide reviews on the apparent flattening of the Phillips curve in the 2000s, and
especially since the financial crisis recession. This literature focuses on the United States.
39See Stock and Watson (2019).
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of explanations focuses on special features of the financial crisis. Gilchrist et al. (2017) show that financial distortions created
an incentive for firms to raise prices in response to adverse financial or demand shocks to preserve internal liquidity and
avoid accessing external finance. This strengthened the countercyclical behavior of markups and attenuated the response of
inflation to output fluctuations. Another explanation refers to expectations. Unlike the literature results discussed above,
which focuses on the United States, Mazumder (2018) finds a stable Phillips curve for the euro area using short-term
professional survey expectations data. He attributes the weakening of euro area inflation to a decline in expected inflation.
To test this theory, it is necessary to estimate potential or trend output in order to define the gap between actual and
potential output. Any test of the gap model is, therefore, a joint test of the estimated gap and of the impact of the gap
on inflation. Unfortunately, estimating trend or potential output is more an art than a science. There are many different
methods, and no one is trouble free. Stock and Watson (2019) recently proposed as a measure of slack real activity variables
that are bandpass filtered or year-over-year changes instead of gaps.
B.2 Institutional variables
The soundness of institutions in place is considered a prevention to the potentially numerous motives for authorities to
inflate.40 The institutional setup of a country can be split in four separate items—central bank independence, central bank
transparency, political stability, and economic growth.
B.2.1 Central Bank Independence
Rogoff (2003) argues that improved institutions and more sophisticated policymakers, not to mention a more sophisticated
public, have played pivotal roles in the global reduction in inflation. Still, the fact that inflation has fallen everywhere—even
in countries with weak institutions, unstable political systems, thinly staffed central banks, etc.—raises the possibility that
other factors have also been significant. Rogoff (2019) points to the influx of inexpensive Chinese imports and the rise of
computers. But if one looks at the timing of when different countries succeeded in bringing down inflation, there is little
question that the most important role has to be assigned to the rise of central bank independence throughout the world as
a remedy for the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) find that CBI has tended
to increase over time in more open economies. In line with this argument, one aspect that has received much attention in
explaining cross-country differences in inflation rates is the degree of central bank independence.
Since the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) central bank independence is
considered an institutional necessity for credible monetary policy geared toward price stability. This proposition has been
widely analyzed with various independence measurements.41 However, the cross-country empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between the degree of central bank independence and inflation is mixed, largely depending on the choice of sample
countries. On the one hand, a robust and significant inverse relationship has been found.42 On the other hand, this result
has been questioned.43 Recently, Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) provide a detailed analysis of the effect of central bank
independence on inflation and its variability during the period from 1998 to 2010 based on annual indices for more than 100
central banks. They find some, albeit statistically inconsistent, negative association between CBI and inflation.
40See Cukierman (1992), Campillo and Miron (1997), Aisen and Veiga (2008), Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010).
41See Arnone et al. (2006) for a survey.
42See, among others, Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Alesina and Summers (1993), Loungani and Sheets (1997), Panagiotidis and
Triampella (2006).
43See, among others, Posen (1995), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Fuhrer (1997), Campillo and Miron (1997), King and Ma (2001), Hayo and
Hefeker (2002), Klomp and de Haan (2010).
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Several possible reasons why a robust negative relation of independence with inflation is wanting have been proposed.
One is the inaccuracy in measurements. Several of the indices that have been constructed to capture the degree of central
bank independence rely on the wording of the law. This de jure measurement may be different from actual (de facto)
independence, particularly in emerging and developing countries.44 Applying latent variable analysis to explicitly deal with
measurement errors, Brumm (2002) concludes that the negative relation can be restored across countries.
A second explanation for the ambiguity in empirical studies is that the literature does not distinguish appropriately
between central bank independence and conservatism.45 According to Rogoff (1985), the inflation bias depends on the
combination of both. If this is not taken properly into account, estimates may be distorted.
A third explanation is given by the lack of data. Earlier studies were based on pure cross-sections of countries. Crowe
and Meade (2008) find a significant negative relationship between both legal and actual independence, the latter measured
by the turnover rate of central bank governors,46 inflation in a sample of 56 countries after exploiting the time dimension
of the data. However, they were unable to identify a significant link in the pure cross-section of the data set. One reason
for this result might be that exploiting the time dimension of the data may diminish possible omitted variable biases which
were identified in a meta-regression analysis of previous studies by Klomp and de Haan (2010). Following Brumm (2002)
and de Haan et al. (2003) on the panel data set provided by Crowe and Meade (2008), Posso and Tawadros (2013) also find
evidence that higher independence is conducive to lower inflation.
This evidence notwithstanding, the literature has little to say about what conditions support the effect of independence
on inflation. As pointed out by Hielscher and Markwardt (2012), while many studies include a range of control variables,
there is very little analysis into the interaction between them. Hielscher and Markwardt (2012) show in a cross-section of
69 countries that higher independence does not necessarily improve the inflation performance. What is crucial is not only a
sufficiently large increase in independence, but also a high quality of political institutions.
B.2.2 Central Bank Transparency
One further fact that needs to be accounted for in the analysis of central bank independence is that its increase has
been accompanied by greater transparency to the point of becoming a key feature of modern monetary policymaking.47
Most central banks announce their objectives with quantitative targets and publish numerical macroeconomic forecasts,
marking a departure from long-standing practice which valued confidentiality. This change is partly a reflection of increased
independence, which has been accompanied by formal accountability requirements. But foremost, central banks have become
more transparent with the aim to make monetary policy more effective.48
Central banks have also become much more open about their policy decisions and some among them even give explicit
guidance about upcoming policy moves (forward guidance). The move toward the provision of more information on future
policy plans has become a prominent feature in monetary policy in countries in which the effective lower bound constraint
has been binding following the deflationary pressions in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, some central banks,
44See Cukierman (1992).
45See Berger et al. (2001), Hayo and Hefeker (2002).
46See Lustenberger and Rossi (2017) for possible differences between legal independence measures and the turnover rate.
47See Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) document that all central banks covered had a higher degree of transparency in 2010 compared to 1998.
Still, central banks differ considerably in the extent to which they are transparent in various respects. Countries with higher per capita income,
deeper financial markets, more open economies, stronger political institutions, and more flexible exchange rate regimes raise the transparency
levels of their central bank.
48See Geraats (2014).
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for example the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, started to give explicit guidance about upcoming policy moves long before
the financial crisis.
Overall, the empirical literature documents beneficial effects from transparency. Sterne et al. (2002) use the survey data
collected by Fry et al. (2000) to find a statistically significant, inverse relationship between average inflation and transparency
across 82 countries after controlling for a number of other factors, including central bank independence. Crowe and Meade
(2007) report, in contrast, that while the relationship between transparency and average monthly inflation is inverse, it is
not significant in their sample of 40 countries. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) find that greater transparency is associated
with lower average levels of inflation after controlling for openness, financial depth, and past inflation.
B.2.3 Political Instability and Orientation
Political instability adds another potentially important element to the analysis of institutions for inflation. It may capture
a number of effects. For example, high turnover rates of political incumbents may increase inflation as the political focus
shifts on short-term gains, neglecting their associated long-term costs. Carmignani (2003) argues that political instability
generates uncertainty about the future course of economic policies. The political framework of a country also determines its
ability to collect taxes. Politically unstable countries tend to use inflation to increase their revenue since their tax system is
more likely to suffer from tax evasion or a larger amount of underground activity.
According to Cukierman et al. (1992) political instability induces the use of revenues from money creation (seigniorage).
The model prediction was tested on cross-section data for 79 countries after controlling for other variables. The outcome
was that political instability significantly contributed to explain the fraction of government revenue derived from seignorage.
Aisen and Veiga (2005) show on a dataset covering around 100 countries from 1960 to 1999 that a higher degree of political
instability is associated with higher inflation whereas higher degrees of economic freedom and democracy are associated with
lower inflation. Similarly, Aisen and Veiga (2008) used the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on
a sample covering 160 countries from 1960 to 1999 and found that higher political instability and social polarization were
associated with more volatile inflation. Telatar et al. (2010) analysed the role of the political and institutional environment
in dynamic panel data estimations on a sample of 39 countries from 1983 to 2002, reporting an adverse effect of political
instability on inflation. This is initially observed only for developed and low-inflation economies. However, when political
freedom is taken into account, political instability turns out to be significant only for high-inflation countries. Based on a
sample of 25 developing countries in South Asia, Middle East and the Sub Saharan African region for the period 1984-2014,
Maruf and Alishahi (2017) uncover, using the Panel maximum Likelihood method, a positive relationship between political
instability and inflation, especially in oil producing countries.
One problem in estimating the effect of political instability on inflation is (potential) collinearity with other independent
variables. More stable countries tend, for instance, to have a higher per capita output growth49 Dincer and Eichengreen
(2014) find that central bank independence and transparency respond to similar economic and institutional variables such as
political stability. To tackle the resulting endogeneity problem, they use political stability as an instrument for transparency.
49See Alesina et al. (1996).
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B.2.4 Growth
GDP and its growth rate are considered important inflation-related factors that have been used by many authors. In Campillo
and Miron (1997) the level of GDP is included to control for country size effects while log of income per capita (in 1980)
controls for various effects. Dollar and Kraay (2003) find that cross-country differences in institutions mirror the differences
in the levels of GDP per capita. Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010) use per capita income as a proxy of a more general
group of institutional arrangements. In Hielscher and Markwardt (2012) GDP per capita controls for various structural
disparities as differences in the financial sector, technologies or optimal inflation.
B.3 Monetary Policy Strategies
The next group of variables accounts for the effects on inflation associated with two monetary policy arrangements. The
first relates to exchange rate arrangements, the second to the adoption of an explicit inflation targeting strategy.
B.3.1 Exchange Rate Regime
Another important element in the debate of driving forces of inflation is the flexibility in exchange rate arrangements adopted
by countries. Under floating exchange rates disequilibria in the balance of payments are adjusted by the exchange rate. Under
a pegged system the adjustments rest on central bank interventions in the currency markets. One rationale for adopting
a fixed exchange rate framework is that it operates as a disciplinary tool for monetary authorities, limiting their ability to
expand monetary base at the risk of causing a balance of payments crisis.50 Another benefit is that a fixed exchange rate
signals enhanced credibility of lower future inflation because countries that have pegged their currencies face costs in terms
of credibility losses if they abandon the peg. As a result, inflation should be lower in countries with fixed exchange rates
because this regime is likely to have been chosen precisely by those suffering from excessive inflation in the past.
Many a study include a dummy variable for the exchange rate regime as a (further) check on time-consistency issues.
Ghosh et al. (1997) find robust evidence of lower inflation under pegged regimes in a sample of 150 countries over 30 years.
The negative relationship between fixed exchange rates and inflation is also reported in Cottarelli et al. (1998) and Husain
et al. (2005). The reason seems to be a smaller money growth and a higher credibility of the monetary system. Similarly,
Bleaney (1999) finds that floating exchange rates are significantly associated with inflation rates at least 10 percent a year
higher than pegged exchange rate regimes in the post Bretton Woods era to 1998.51
B.3.2 Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting (IT) is an operational framework for monetary policy aimed at achieving a numerical value (or range)
for the inflation rate. A growing number of countries have adopted IT over the last two decades. Starting in the early
1990s with a handful of advanced economies, by the late 1990s and early 2000s central banks in emerging economies began
adopting IT as well. Emerging market countries, in particular, were searching for a nominal anchor that did not have the
instability associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. By 2006 eight advanced economies and 13 emerging market countries
had adopted it.52 At the start of 2012, some 27 central banks were considered fully-fledged inflation targeters, and several
50See Mohanty and Bhanumurthy (2014).
51See Ilzetzki et al. (2019) provide a history of anchor or reference currencies, exchange rate arrangements, and a new measure of foreign exchange
restrictions for 194 countries and territories from 1946 to 2016.
52See Batini and Laxton (2007).
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others were in the process of establishing an IT regime.53 Perceived benefits of IT include both lower inflation and inflation
variability, while retaining enough flexibility to respond to macroeconomic shocks to stabilize output.
A growing literature on the effects of IT on average inflation, inflation volatility, average economic growth, and its
volatility has emerged. The evidence mostly concludes that IT is beneficial in terms of lowering inflation, its volatility and
inflation expectations.54 However, Ball and Sheridan (2005) argue that IT makes no difference among industrial countries.
Its apparent success in the period of global disinflation, when inflation experienced a reversion toward the mean, seems to
be sample dependent. More recent studies that include emerging markets tend to find stronger evidence of positive effects
from IT.55 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) find that the largest inflation reduction is experienced by emerging market
economies and converging-to-target ITs.
Brito and Bystedt (2010) emphasize that key for finding any effect of IT on inflation is the choice of the control group.
Using the GMM systems estimator as opposed to the commonly used difference-in-differences estimator employed in Ball and
Sheridan (2005), Brito and Bystedt (2010) report weaker support for the effect of IT on average inflation, inflation volatility,
and growth volatility, and provide evidence that average growth is lower under IT. Surveying the literature, Ball (2010)
concludes that the evidence of beneficial effects of IT in emerging economies, while stronger than in advanced countries, is
not yet conclusive.
In this vein, Alpanda and Honig (2014) argue that not all emerging economies are the same and that IT may work better
in some than in others. In particular, since central banks differ in their degree of independence, this may interact with an
IT regime to produce different macroeconomic outcomes. It is possible, therefore, that when this distinction is not made,
conclusive results for the effects of IT in a subset of countries are weakened by the inclusion of countries for which IT has
no effect. When differentiating the impact of IT based on the degree of central bank independence, they find large effects
in emerging economies with low independence of the central bank. This suggests that an independent central bank is not a
prerequisite for countries to experience significant declines in inflation after the adoption of IT. One channel through which
IT lowers inflation more in countries with low central bank independence is by reducing budget deficits.
B.4 Public Finances
Another important topic in the literature is the impact of fiscal imbalances.56 Public deficits and debt have been extensively
discussed as potential sources of price instability. Given the limits on domestic and foreign borrowing, monetization is the
residual form of deficit financing. A well-established theory in macroeconomics is that governments running persistent deficits
have sooner or later to finance those deficits with money creation (seigniorage). Across centuries and countries, a common
way in which sovereigns have paid for high debt is by high and even hyperinflation. In the aftermath of the financial crisis
financial bailouts, stimulus spending, and lower revenues have resulted in public debts in advanced economies that have
surpassed the peaks reached during World War I and the Great Depression.57 The question is whether expanding public
debts will be inflationary. There are several theoretical channels for how public indebtedness may unleash inflation.
53See Hammond (2012).
54See Truman (2003), Hyvonen (2004), Vega and Winkelried (2005), among others.
55See Batini and Laxton (2007), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Gonc¸alves and Salles (2008), Lin and Ye (2009), Abo-Zaid and Tuzemen
(2012).
56See, for example, Montiel (1989) and Bruno and Fischer (1990).
57See Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).
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Conventional view Traditional analysis of the fiscal impact on inflation focusses mostly on Keynesian aggregate demand
considerations, public wage spill-overs to private sector wages, and taxes affecting marginal costs and private consumption.
According to the conventional view, an increase in public debt may cause inflation by inducing a positive wealth effect on
households. Demand for goods and services will raise and ultimately inflate the economy.58
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic Following Milton Friedman, the most widely accepted school of thought on inflation
is that it is “always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”. This is based on the quantity theory of money which posits
that inflation is determined solely by the change in the relative supply of money and goods. Following this logic, disinflation
policy in many countries is framed with the objective of constraining monetary growth to be in line with the expansion in
nominal income and not to accommodate imprudent fiscal policies. However, given that current money demand should depend
on expectations about future inflation, a purely monetary effort at reducing inflation may not be successful. Theoretically,
once account is taken of forward-looking expectations, multiple equilibrium paths for inflation can coexist. Under such
circumstances, money supply alone may not be sufficient to pin down the time path of inflation.
Against this background, attention has increasingly been paid to the role of fiscal policy in determining inflation. The
main result of the seminal paper by Sargent and Wallace (1981) is that the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling
inflation depends critically on its coordination with fiscal policy. In their model, tighter monetary policy could lead to higher
inflation under certain circumstances, even when the traditional relation between money and the price level holds. Given
the limits on domestic and foreign borrowing, monetization is the residual form of deficit financing. With the demand for
government bonds given and in the absence of changes in future fiscal policy, a part of government obligations has to be
covered by seigniorage at some point in the future. In line with this argument, Friedman (1994) expressed the view that
expansionary fiscal policy had generated inflation in the US by encouraging overly expansionary monetary policy.
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level A similar reasoning lies behind the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). The FTPL
identifies the wealth effect of government debt as an additional channel of fiscal influence on inflation. It posits that increased
government debt adds to household wealth (defying Ricardian Equivalence) and, hence, to demand for goods and services,
ushering in price pressures.59
Amid debates on the coherence of the theory (Buiter (1999) and Niepelt (2004)), it has spawned an extensive literature.60
The implications of rising public debt for inflation are observationally similar between the Sargent-Wallace framework and the
FTPL. Nonetheless, there is an important theoretical distinction between the two.61 Under FTPL, an increase in government
debt raises the wealth of bond holders while not reducing those of others. Long-term bond prices rise, boost aggregate demand
and push up the price level. Money supply, which is endogenous in this regime, will increase in accommodation of the higher
money demand. The price level is the factor equilibrating nominal value of future discounted primary surplus and nominal
value of public debt. Under the Sargent-Wallace framework an increase in government debt not fully backed by future
real primary surpluses will increase concerns about monetization of public debt, raising inflation expectations and thereby
reducing bond demand and increasing long-term interest rates. This will in turn reduce money demand and push up the
price level even without a contemporaneous increase in money supply.
58See Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
59See Cochrane (2011) argues that the current high levels of US debt may lead to higher inflation through the FTPL.
60See, among others, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Canzoneri et al. (2001), Cochrane (2001), Woodford (2001), De Graeve and Queijo von
Heideken (2015).
61See Leeper and Yun (2006).
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Optimal Tax A fourth explanation based on a fiscal view is based on optimal tax considerations. Most economists
acknowledge that differences in monetary and fiscal policies among countries are the main reasons behind the inflation
variability they sustain. However, this explanation leads to a much deeper and fundamental question, which is why countries
differ on the way they conduct fiscal and monetary policies. One of the many attempts that have been made to answer this
question is based on the idea that structural features of a specific economy determine its government’s ability to collect taxes.
This view implies that countries’ ability to tax is technologically constrained by their stage of development and structure of
their economies, and as tax collecting costs are high and tax evasion pervasive, countries might use the inflation tax more
frequently.
One interpretation is that governments in poor countries might find it optimal to rely more heavily on seigniorage instead
of output taxes to finance their expenditures. According to the Theory of Optimal Taxation governments optimally equate
the marginal cost of the inflation tax with that of output taxes.62 Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992)
fail to find evidence that this theory applies to developing countries. The empirical failure of the Theory of Optimal Taxation
motivated the use of theoretical and empirical models focusing on the role played by political and institutional variables
discussed above.
Debt Management An important issue in the discussion about possible implications of public debt is its structure. In
the models by Calvo (1988) and Missale and Blanchard (1994) higher levels of privately held government debt with a longer
maturity raise the incentive for a government to attempt a surprise inflation. In this literature, foreign-currency, inflation-
indexed or short-term debt are remedies against surprise inflation. More recently, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
argue that the problem of debt maturity choice involves a trade-off between hedging and disciplining properties.63 While
short-term debt is useful for providing the right incentives, long-term debt is useful for hedging consumption. Similarly,
in Ottonello and Perez (2019) the government’s currency composition trades off local currency debt, which provides useful
hedging properties, with foreign currency debt, which avoids inflationary costs and real exchange rate distrortions. In the
FTPL government debt not backed by expected future surpluses will ensue in inflation, immediately or, depending on the
maturity structure, in the future ((Cochrane, 2001)).
Empirical Evidence A large empirical literature examines the link between fiscal policy and inflation. Much of it focuses
on the role of budget deficits. Despite the theoretical view that fiscal deficits are inflationary, empirical studies have yet
to provide a strong and statistically significant connection between fiscal deficits and inflation across a broad range of
countries and inflation rates. While there is widespread consensus that hyperinflations are caused by fiscal imbalances, at
more-moderate inflations the evidence of a link is murkier. Empirical studies of developing countries generally indicate that
the inflationary effect of deficit financing is insignificant, but do find a significant causality of fiscal deficits on inflation in
high-inflation countries.64
Rather than looking at inflation, several studies examine the link between money creation and deficits. For the US,
Hamburger and Zwick (1981) find after World War II that monetary growth was influenced by deficits, but only in specific
episodes. Likewise, King and Plosser (1985) show that whether deficits can predict monetary growth depends on what other
variables are used in the forecasting exercise. Their conclusion is that there is no evidence of a link between monetary growth
62See Phelps (1973), Ve´gh (1989), and Aizenman (1992).
63This is the main message from the Fiscal Insurance Theory of debt management. See Missale (1997).
64See Lin and Chu (2013) for a review of the empirical literature.
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and deficits in the US. King and Plosser (1985) also find no evidence of a link between deficits and seigniorage in 11 other
countries.65
More recent research on the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation has exploited both time and cross-sectional
dimensions of data. Again, results are inconclusive. While Karras (1994) finds that deficits are not inflationary in a panel
estimation in 32 countries, Cottarelli et al. (1998) find a significant impact of fiscal deficits on inflation in industrial and
transition economies by using a dynamic panel data model. Fischer et al. (2002) expand the analysis to a data set of
94 developing and developed countries during 1960–1995 to investigate the relationship between inflation, money growth,
seigniorage and fiscal deficits. According to their cross-sectional analysis fiscal deficits are significantly positively linked to
seigniorage and inflation. Exploiting their panel data they show that in countries with high average inflation, fiscal deficits
are main drivers. However, this effect is no longer significant in low-inflation countries or in high-inflation countries during
low-inflation episodes.
In short, empirical studies have encountered difficulties in uncovering a statistically significant and strong relationship
between budget deficits and inflation. An important reason is the use of data samples with a disproportionately high weight
on advanced countries or economies with historically low inflation.66 Countries which have well-established institutions that
curb fiscal profligacy, central banks that are credibly committed to low inflation, and deep financial markets, arguably have
great latitude in managing their intertemporal budget constraints.67
Another reason that makes it difficult to uncover any fiscal deficit-inflation relationship among developing countries is
inadequate modeling. Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) argue that the fixed effects estimator combined with specifications that
do not account for differences in the size of the inflation tax base imparts a downward bias on the relevant cross-country
estimates. Hence, unlike previous studies, Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) model inflation as non-linearly related to fiscal deficits
through the inflation tax base and estimate this relationship as intrinsically dynamic, using panel techniques that explicitly
distinguish between short- and long-run effects of fiscal deficits. The sample consists of 107 countries over the 1960 2001
period. It results that the inflationary effect of deficits on inflation depends on the financial depth of a country, the inflation
tax base and the credibility of monetary authorities. Fiscal deficits are inflationary in high-inflation and developing countries,
but not in low-inflation and advanced countries. Developing countries with less efficient tax collection, political instability,
and limited access to external borrowing tend to have a lower relative cost of seigniorage and thus a higher inflation tax.
Reflecting the ambiguous mood in the empirical literature, several cross-country studies on the determinants of inflation do
not even include fiscal balances in their regressions, implicitly or explicitly, assuming that fiscal balances play no role or that
their effects are indirectly captured by other variables.68
Lin and Chu (2013) apply the dynamic panel quantile regression (DPQR) model under the autoregressive distributional
lag (ARDL) specification to analyze the deficit inflation relationship in 91 countries spanning from 1960 to 2006. They report
budget deficits having strongly affected inflation in high-inflation episodes and weakly in low-inflation episodes. CASTRO
et al. (2003) find that the extent of debt monetization in OECD countries is negatively associated with the degree of central
bank independence. Kwon et al. (2009) apply a dynamic fixed-effect estimator and a fist-difference GMM estimator on data
65Seigniorage has been important for many developing countries that have experienced high inflation. As an example, Sargent et al. (2009)
report that seigniorage frequently raised revenues of more than 5 percent of GDP for Argentina and Brazil during their high-inflation years, with
occasional higher spikes. In the case of low-inflation economies, however, this number is always very small.
66See Cata˜o and Terrones (2005).
67See Canzoneri et al. (2001).
68See Romer (1993), Lane (1997), Campillo and Miron (1997), Loungani and Swagel (2003).
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of 71 countries from 1962 to 2004 and show that debt growth leads to inflation in indebted developing countries, but less so
in other developing countries. In advanced countries a growing debt is less inflationary.
A considerable literature has also examined whether the behavior of inflation over time, and especially its relation to
other taxes, is consistent with the principles of optimal taxation.69 Campillo and Miron (1997) analyze whether differences
in average inflation rates across countries are consistent with optimal tax considerations. On the one hand, optimal tax
suggests that countries with higher expenditure ratios should have higher levels of all taxes, including inflation. On the
other hand, these considerations imply that holding expenditures constant, inflation should be higher in countries where the
demand for money is relatively inelastic. Differences in this elasticity might occur because of differences in the sophistication
of the banking system, since highly developed banking systems provide good substitutes for money and therefore more elastic
money demand. Campillo and Miron (1997) report a positive and significant relation between the public debt ratio (measured
in 1975) and average inflation in a sample 1973-1994. This holds for the whole sample, for high income and other countries.
According to Campillo and Miron (1997) the evidence is consistent with the view that inflation has been used as it should
be from an optimal tax perspective.
This result does not seem to be robust to the sample period. By using debt and inflation data that span the entire
post-1960 period, specifically including the important inflation starts that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970, Boschen
and Weise (2003) show that the positive correlation between the average debt ratio and the average inflation is smaller and
not statistically significant.
Empirical Contributions to the debt management literature on time-inconsistency issues are few and far between and
mostly focused on advanced countries. Missale and Blanchard (1994) provide evidence in line with the theoretical model on
some highly-indebted European countries and Mandilaras and Levine (2001) on a sample of 15 OECD countries. Aizenman
and Marion (2011) argue that US policymakers have a strong incentive to inflate the debt, similar to the period after World
War II when inflation reduced the debt by about 40 percent within a decade. However, they also point to some important
differences with the current situation. On the one hand, the shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate,
while the larger share held by foreigners would increase it. Similarly, Hilscher et al. (2014) estimate that higher inflation
would unlikely lower the real value of US debt significantly. The reasons are expectations of modest inflation and short
maturities of publicly held debt. The conclusion that arises is that it is the interaction between financial repression and
long maturities of debt that allows for significant effects of inflation. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) argue that the
problem of debt maturity choice involves a trade-off between hedging and disciplining properties. While short-term debt is
useful for providing the right incentives, long-term debt is useful for hedging consumption. Similarly, Ottonello and Perez
(2019) the government’s currency composition trades off local currency debt, which provides useful hedging properties, with
foreign currency debt, which avoids inflationary costs and real exchange rate distortions.
B.5 Globalization
Another potentially important driver of inflation over the past two decades is globalization. In the literature there are at
least two lines of argument about how increased globalization may have affected inflation in the long run. The first ist due
to Rogoff (2003) who argues that globalization reduces the inflation bias associated with discretionary monetary policy. In a
more competitive world—brought about by globalization, deregulation, and less government involvement in the economy—
69See Mankiw (1987), Poterba and Rotemberg (1990), Grilli et al. (1991).
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monetary policy has smaller effects on real activity, and central banks have less incentive to inflate. Globalization also has
permanent effects on the inflation rate by closing the gap between the target level of output pursued by the central bank and
the natural rate of output. Similarly Romer (1993) argues that more open economies have steeper Phillips curves so that their
policymakers face a larger output-inflation tradeoff. The reason for this is that an unanticipated monetary expansion causes
real exchange rate depreciation, raising costs for households and businesses. The larger the share of imported goods—the
more open the economy—the greater the increase in inflation. Thus, if the temptation to pursue expansionary policy is an
important determinant of inflation, it will be lower in more open economies, resulting in lower average inflation.
The second line of thought associated with globalization and its effects on inflation holds that in a more integrated
world, competition between currencies forces central banks to adopt best practices and keep inflation at bay. However, this
disciplining effect is related to financial globalization, rather than real globalization.70
In his empirical study on a cross-section of 114 countries based on 1973-88 averages, Romer (1993) finds a robust negative
relationship between openness, proxied by the ratio of imports to GDP, and inflation. More specifically, while Romer (1993)
finds that the basic correlation is robust to conditioning on other variables (development level of a country, CBI, and political
stability) essentially no relationship between openness and inflation is reported for the most developed countries. Average
inflation in the richest countries tends to be low regardless of how open they are. This suggests that these countries have
largely solved the time-consistency problem that leads to higher inflation in less advanced economies. Similarly, Badinger
(2009) finds that the relationship between openness and inflation disappears in OECD countries. Bleaney (1999) reports,
using 1989-98 averages, that the negative relation between economic openness and inflation is not statistically significant.
The two main follow-up studies that look at the same time period as Romer (1993), are Lane (1997) and Terra (1998).71
By conditioning on country size, per capita income, and central bank independence the relationship between openness and
inflation becomes statistically significant and negative even for the advanced economies. However, the relationship can
be lessened by controlling for development and indebtedness. Campillo and Miron (1997) use a slightly extended sample
period (1973-94) of 62 countries and also condition on a wider set of variables (prior inflation experience, optimal tax
considerations, and time-consistency issues in areas other than monetary policy). Their finding is that even for developed
countries is greater openness associated with significantly lower inflation.72 In this vein, Daniels et al. (2005) and Badinger
(2009) report a robustly negative effect of openness on inflation in a broad cross-section of countries (except for OECD
countries).
The cited studies use a cross-section specification. The alternative is to exploit the time-series structure of the data and
use panel estimation methods.73 Alfaro (2005) reports an inflation increasing effect of openness in a panel of 148 countries.
However, Wynne and Kersting (2007) argue that the evidence noted by Alfaro (2005) seems to rest entirely on her use of
annual data. Taking five-year averages (like Gruben and McLeod (2004)), a negative relationship between openness and
inflation is re-established. In contrast to Alfaro (2005), Sachsida et al. (2003) and Gruben and McLeod (2004) employ
instrumental variable estimators to deal with endogeneity problems. Both author pairs find evidence of an inflation-reducing
70See Wynne and Kersting (2007).
71See Lane (1997), however, emphasizes a different channel through which openness and inflation may be related, namely the degree of imperfect
competition and price rigidity in the non-traded sector.
72By contrast, central bank independence turns out to be unimportant in developed and also developing countries. Campillo and Miron (1997)
conclude that it is mainly structural factors—openness, political stability, and tax policy—and not institutional characteristics of an economy,
particularly the degree of central bank independence and exchange rate arrangements, that drive differences in inflation across countries.
73However, Romer (1993) argues that this would likely yield biased estimates because changes in openness within countries are caused by changes
in trade policy and other macroeconomic factors that could also affect inflation through other channels.
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effect of openness. Sachsida et al. (2003) confirm Romer’s findings not limited to a certain group of countries or a specific
time frame.
Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) control for openness, measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, in their above-
mentioned study on deficits and inflation. The results are not only dependent on the estimation procedure, but also on
the country group. Only for the advanced country group does openness yield a statistically significant negative coefficient,
confirming that the openness-inflation results are sample specific, as argued by Terra (1998) and Bleaney (1999). Dincer and
Eichengreen (2014) also control for openness (also measured by the sum of exports and imports to GDP) in GMM estimates
of inflation. The coefficient is weakly significant or insignificant with negative sign. Lotfalipour et al. (2013) show in a static
panel that countries which are exposed to oil price shocks have a positive relation between openness and inflation.
In short, there are many ways in which increased openness can lead to a lower price level. However, as pointed out by
Wynne and Kersting (2007) it is important to keep in mind that most of these are one-time effects, implying a transitory
impact on inflation. Nevertheless, these one-time effects may take a long time to play out, so that the temporary effects may
last quite a long time.
An important observation is that inflation has become increasingly globally synchronized.74 Recent research has high-
lighted a large and growing role of global factors in explaining movements in national inflation rates. Ciccarelli and Mojon
(2010) in their seminal paper find that 70% of the variance of national inflation rates in 22 OECD countries can be explained
by a common global factor. Parker (2018) confirms that global inflation factors can explain a large share of the variance of
national inflation rates of advanced economies but not of middle-income and low-income economies. Jasova et al. (2019) use
a New-Keynesian Phillips curve framework which controls for nonlinear exchange rate movements for a panel of 26 advanced
and 22 emerging economies. Both global and domestic output gaps are significant drivers of inflation both in the pre-crisis
(1994–2008) and post-crisis (2008–2017) periods. However, after the crisis, the effect of the domestic output gap declines in
advanced economies, whereas in emerging economies it is the effect of the global output gap that declines. Forbes (2019)
shows that inflation models should control for changes in the global economy and allow for key parameters to adjust over
time. Global factors (global commodity prices, global slack, exchange rates, and producer price competition) can affect
inflation after controlling for the standard domestic variables.
B.6 Demography
One noteable fact observable since the 1980s in most advanced countries has been an increase in the proportion of middle-
aged people and retirees. In the effort to understand the sources of the decline in inflation observed over the recent past,
the adverse demographic trend has been invoked as a further possible driver. There have been extensive studies on various
aspects of demographic changes and their effect on the economy, for instance on economic growth. However, until recently
little attention was paid to the question on whether there exists a connection between the observed disinflationary trend and
societies’ ageing.
The resulting empirical evidence is inconclusive. One reason may be that it is not easy to choose appropriate variables for
capturing demographic changes. Another, more critical, is that the theoretical transmission channels from ageing populations
to economic variables are manifold, working their ways through simultaneously and with offsetting effects. For example,
ageing will have multifarious demand-side effects due to changing consumption preferences, possibly leading to a reduction
74See Ha et al. (2019).
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in aggregate demand and lower inflation. On the other hand, it would reduce the effective supply of labor, adding inflation
pressures.
Actually, the most prominent hypotheses on the link between population ageing and inflation relate to the theories on
life-cycle consumption and savings, secular stagnation, impact on financial wealth and political economy whose underlying
channels reach contradictory conclusions on the impact of demographic developments on inflation.75
Life-cycle theory According to the life-cycle theory individuals smooth their consumption over lifetime. As the savings
rate tends to be lower when the share of young and old-age dependents in total population increase, a discrepancy between
aggregate demand and supply arises, and props up inflation to equate at steady state. The shrinking labor supply puts
upward pressure on wages, further pushing up inflation. The bottom line is that ageing is inflationary.
Secular stagnation Secular stagnation describes an economic condition of negligible economic growth and low potential
growth, as savings are higher due to demographic change than long-term investments needed to promote future growth. A
lower rate of return on capital depresses investment and economic growth and dampens price dynamics. Shirakawa (2013)
argues that ageing can exert deflationary pressures by lowering expectations of future economic growth. While people may
ignore the implications of population ageing for a while, they revise their expectations when they recognise the extent of the
economic impact. The resulting loss of demand and investment might not be easily offset by monetary policy, especially if
inflation is already low and policy rates are close to the effective lower bound.
Financial wealth Pensioners sell accumulated wealth held abroad and repatriate funds leading to an appreciation of the
domestic currency, which lowers costs of imports and exerts a deflationary pressure.
Political economy Bullard et al. (2012) suggest an explanation based on the political economy of central banking. Based
on the life-cycle hypothesis, as young and working-age people have fewer assets and receive wages, they prefer higher inflation,
whereas older people that depend more on asset returns as a source of income will take more influence on redistributive policy
to grant low inflation. The swelling share of pensioners causes their political power to increase and express their preferences
for low inflation that would otherwise erode the real rate of return from their savings. To the degree their policies reflect
voter preferences, central banks may place a greater emphasis on price stability.
Given the theoretical ambiguity, some empirical investigations have stepped in to shed light, but, not surprisingly, their
conclusions are contradictory. Most of the papers have focused on Japan as its transition from ageing society to aged society
is the fastest in the world, but other advanced economies have also started to be in the limelight. Recent work, using survey
data, suggests that inflation expectations rise with age, implying higher concern and, hence, risk aversion to inflation in a
greying society.76
Some empirical studies including Anderson et al. (2014), Yoon et al. (2014), Gajewski (2015), and Bobeica et al. (2017)
find empirical evidence for ageing to be associated with deflationary pressures. In contrast, Juselius and Taka´ts (2015)
document that ageing leads to more inflation. Similarly, Aksoy et al. (2015) estimate long-run effects of the changing age
profile and find that dependent cohorts enhance the inflationary pressures in the long run.
75See Bobeica et al. (2017).
76See Blanchflower and MacCoille (2009).
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Motivated by the experience of Japan, Anderson et al. (2014) find that substantial deflationary pressures arise from
population ageing, mainly through declining growth and falling land prices, based on simulations of a calibrated model
(rather than being empirically motivated and validated). Yoon et al. (2014) use panel data covering 30 OECD economies
from 1960 to 2013 for regressions of inflation on population growth, the share of 65 and over, the share of 15-64, life
expectancy, terms-of-trade changes, GDP growth, M2 growth, and budget balance changes. The results suggest that ageing,
measured by the share of 65 and over, is deflationary.77
Gajewski (2015) examines the relationship between inflation and ageing in a panel data model estimated for all 34 OECD
member countries over the period ranging from 1970 to 2013 employing four-year averages for the variables (and controlling
for the log of per capital GDP). The results suggest that there are deflationary rather than inflationary consequences of
ageing.
Bobeica et al. (2017) investigate the case of the euro area and in comparison to the US and Germany. This allows them
to treat each economy individually, as opposed to papers investigating relationships in a panel framework, pooling together
countries with very different demographic situations. Demographics is a slow-moving process, unlikely to influence inflation
at business cycle frequency. For this reason, they focus on long-term relationships between the two variables by employing
a cointegration framework. Bobeica et al. (2017) find supporting evidence for a positive relation between inflation and the
growth of working age population in total population. A diminishing growth rate of the working age population, which can
occur due to a higher share of the elderly, comes hand in hand with fading inflationary pressures if the monetary policy does
not react.
Juselius and Taka´ts (2015) attribute different effects of dependents and working age cohorts to a possible demand channel.
They argue that countries with more people consuming goods and services than producing them are liable to having excess
demand and thus inflationary tendencies. Those with more producers than consumers will, by contrast, have excess supply
and a deflationary bias. In line with this explanation they find in a panel of 22 advanced countries over the period 1955 to
2010 that an increase in the number of dependents, young and old, is generally inflationary, whereas having more people
of working age is linked to lower inflation. They also show that the deflationary effects of ageing found in previous studies
are driven primarily by the very old (80+ year old) cohort. These results are robust to different country samples, time
periods, control variables and estimation techniques. Overall, according to their results ageing would eventually lead to
higher inflation, contrary to most arguments and previous evidence. In a more recent paper, Juselius and Taka´ts (2018)
obtain similar results derived from long panel data stretching 1870 to 2016 from 22 advanced economies. A robust relationship
emerges that accords with the lifecycle hypothesis: Inflationary pressure rises when the share of dependents increases and,
conversely, subsides when the share of working age population increases.
Aksoy et al. (2015) estimate effects of changes in demographic structure on medium-run trends of key macroeconomic
variables using a Panel VAR of 21 OECD economies over a sample period 1970-2007 based on annual observations. Young
and old dependents are found to have a negative impact while workers contribute positively.
77All other exogenous variables are highly significant with the expected signs.
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B.7 Natural Resources
The oil price is a well-known source of inflationary pressures in the world economy78 and the change in the oil price has been
used as a control variable in several empirical studies.79 Cun˜ado and Pe´rez de Gracia (2003) find evidence of cointegration
in the oil price-inflation relation in 11 of 15 European countries between 1960 and 1999.
Either oil prices are denominated in dollar terms or in domestic currency. For instance, Loungani and Swagel (2003) use
oil prices in dollar terms, and each country has the same values for the price of oil in a particular year. By contrast, Lin
and Chu (2013) employ oil prices in the local currency, so that each country faces different energy prices. In these empirical
studies it is shown that the impact of oil prices on domestic long-term inflation is stronger among advanced countries than
among developing countries. For instance, LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) show that a 10 percentage points oil price increase
will boost inflation by 0.1-0.8 percentage points in the US and the EU. In Cata˜o and Terrones (2005) a 1 percentage point
increase in oil price inflation is estimated to raise advanced country inflation by near 0.2 percentage points. Ha et al. (2019)
document in exceptionally a large sample of countries of 141 EMDEs and 34 advanced economies over 1970-2018 that rapid
changes in global inflation have occurred near turning points of the global business cycle or in the wake of sharp movements
in global oil prices.
B.8 Past Inflation
In empirical studies past inflation is often controlled for.80 Countries that experienced high inflation might be more aware
of its negative consequences and oppose it more forcefully. Germany’s hyperinflation experience is frequently offered as the
reason for its inflation aversion.81 A survey conducted by Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2009) in 23 countries from 1981–2000
reveals that memories of hyperinflation are there to last. However, memories of moderately high inflation tend to fade after
around 10 to 15 years.
Hayo (1998), asking the same survey question as Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2009), argues that there is no“inflation
gene that determines their preference”. Rather the preferences for price stability are seen as a result of a country’s economic
culture. Survey respondents in low inflation countries tend to be more sensitive to increasing inflation than in higher-inflation
countries.
A related effect that can be assessed by past inflation rates is inflation inertia, according to which inflationary shocks
may translate into higher inflation expectations through wage and price contracts, which in turn materialize in terms of
higher actual inflation.82 Also, as Alpanda and Honig (2014) point out, lagged inflation may account for mean reversion as
inflation targeting countries tend to start with higher inflation rates and thus are more likely to experience larger drops in
their inflation rates. Omitting this variable would bias the estimate of the IT coefficient.
In the New Keynesian literature there are four approaches establishing a link between past and current inflation. The
first is the model by Gali and Gertler (1999) in which price reoptimization is done ollowing a rule of thumb, the second is the
indexation model proposed by Christiano et al. (2005), the third is the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002)
78See Ball and Mankiw (1995) propose a theoretical model to describe supply-side shocks, wherein an increase in the relative price of oil could
affect the aggregate price level.
79See Barsky and Kilian (2002), Loungani and Swagel (2003), LeBlanc and Chinn (2004), Hamilton and Herrera (2004), Cata˜o and Terrones
(2005), Lin and Chu (2013). See Kilian (2008) and Hamilton (2008) for a review of the literature on the effect of energy price shocks on the U.S.
economy.
80See Campillo and Miron (1997), Kwon et al. (2009), Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2010), Lin and Chu (2013), Alpanda and Honig (2014),
Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).
81See, for instance, Cukierman (1992).
82See Lim and Papi (1997), Loungani and Swagel (2003), and Kamin and Klau (2003).
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which distinguishes between reoptimizing agents with adaptive expectations and those relying on past inflation as proxy for
expected inflation.
Bikai et al. (2016) use a Panel Vector Autoregressive approach on CEMAC countries (Economic and Monetary Community
of Central Africa) and data from 1990 to 2014 to show that money supply and imported inflation are the two main sources
of inflation in CEMAC countries. Nevertheless, money supply and imported inflation account for only 30% of the dynamics
of inflation. 64% of it is determined by inflation itself.
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